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INTRODUCTION

T

his Article documents the exercise of coercive power1 by public
police services and private security companies in response to the
needs of foreign-owned mining companies in an environment of social
protest and opposition. It describes how a particular transnational private
* B.A. (Toronto), LL.B. (Saskatchewan), LL.M. (Osgoode), Doctoral Candidate,
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada, and Coordinator of the Justice and
Corporate Accountability Project (“JCAP”). The empirical work that this Article is based
on was funded in part by a grant from the Global Consortium for the Transformation of
Security and by the Shin Imai Fund for Human Rights at Osgood Hall Law School. A
translation of the previous version of this Article was published in 68 APUNTES: CENTRO
DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL PACIFICO 63–108 (2011) (Peru). The Author
would like to thank Professor Shin Imai, for his constant support in all of the processes
that made this research possible, and Jesica Karina Chuquilín Figueroa, for her indispensible collaboration in the development of this project.
1. The term “coercive power” refers to two key sets of practices: (1) the armed protection of private and state property, and (2) practices of surveillance, harassment, and
intimidation.
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security company has been confronted with a broad international social
movement of human rights and environmental activists who are simultaneously invoking multiple regimes of domestic and international law in
an effort to hold the company to account for its actions. Peru offers an
important case study with regard to these issues because it is a relatively
poor developing country dominated by foreign-owned mining activity.
Between 1990 and 2000, former president Alberto Fujimori initiated the
neo-liberalization of the Peruvian economy2 through a series of political
and economic legislative reforms that sought to integrate the country into
the global economy and reduce the presence of the state in all areas of
economic and social policy.3 In terms of the resource extraction sector,4
this included the complete privatization of mineral production5 and the
restructuring of the country’s legal regimes to create favorable conditions
for foreign investors. As a result, in 2001 the International Monetary
Fund evaluated Peru as one of the national economies most open to foreign investment in the world.6 Following the fall of Fujimori in 2000,
subsequent governments7 advanced policies that continued the neoliberalization of Peru’s economic and legal order.8 By 2006, Peru was

2. See Kurt Gerhard Weyland, Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A
Mixed Record, 46 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y, Spring 2004, at 135–41.
3. Jeffery Bury, Neoliberalismo, Minería y Cambios Rurales en Cajamarca [Neoliberalism, Mining and Rural Change in Cajamarca], in ANTHONY BEBBINGTON, MINERÍA,
MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES Y RESPUESTAS CAMPESINAS [MINING, RURAL SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND ANSWERS] 49, 50–56 (2007).
4. The term “resource extraction sector” refers to the economic actors and activities
that extract resources such as minerals, oil, natural gas, or lumber from the natural environment.
5. State control of mineral production declined from half to approximately one percent of total production. David Szablowski, Mining, Displacement and the World Bank:
A Case Analysis of Compania Minera Antamina’s Operations in Peru, 39 J. BUS. ETHICS
247, 258 (2002).
6. Bury, supra note 3, at 58–59.
7. This trend ostensibly changed in 2011 when Ollanta Humala was elected President of Peru on a platform that promised to introduce regulatory measures to promote a
more equitable distribution of wealth, especially in the area of resource extraction. Stephanie Boyd, Business as Usual: Peru’s New President Leaps to the Right, NEW
INTERNATIONALIST MAG. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.newint.org/features/webexclusive/2011/12/07/peru-new-president-mine-strikes. However, by the close of 2011,
Humala was already a major disappointment to his supporters on the political left due to
his militarized response to social protests and his stance in favor of controversial resource
extraction projects. Id.
8. For an overview of the reforms introduced by subsequent governments in the area
of land law, see Pedro Castillo Castañeda, El Derecho a la Tierra y los Acuerdos Internacionales: el Caso de Perú [Land Rights and International Agreements: The Case of
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one of the top mineral producing countries on the globe, with net project
profits in the mostly foreign-owned mining sector totaling over seven
billion dollars.9
A record level of social and environmental conflict matches these record profits.10 The majority of resource extraction conflicts relate to mining activities11 and many of Peru’s six thousand “Campesino Communities”12 own or occupy land in areas affected by mining.13 These Communities are recognized in a legislative and constitutional framework that
Peru]
CEPES
(Oct.
2009),
http://www.cepes.org.pe/apc-aa/archivosaa/a01e3bc3e44a89cf3cd03d717396a20e/El_Derecho_a_la_tierra.pdf.
9. Alfredo C. Gurmendi, The Mineral Industry of Peru, in 2006 MINERALS
YEARBOOK: PERU 15.1 (U.S. Dep’t Interior & U.S. Geological Survey eds., 2009), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2006/myb3-2006-pe.pdf.
10. Anthony J. Bebbington & Jeffrey T. Bury, Institutional Challenges for Mining
and Sustainability in Peru, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17296, 17296 (2009) (“In 2007,
the Peruvian Ombudsman’s office recorded 78 conflicts in the country, 37 of which were
socio-environmental in kind, and 33 related to mining; by 2009, it recorded 250 conflicts,
of which 125 were socio-environmental in kind, and 89 related to mining.”); see, e.g.,
Franklin Briceno, Peru Cancels Mine After Police Kill 6 Protesters, Wound 30,
POST
(Jun.
23,
2011,
11:34
PM),
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/25/peru-mine-protest-santa-ana-bearcreek_n_884587.html?view=screen; Rory Carroll, Peru Declares Curfew after Bloody
Clashes in Amazon Jungle, GUARDIAN, June 8, 2009, at 17; Simon Romero, As China
Expands in Latin America, Tensions Fester At Its Mining Ventures in Peru, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2010, at A6; John Vidal, ‘We Are Fighting For Our Lives and Our Dignity’:
Across the Globe, as Mining and Oil Firms Race For Dwindling Resources, Indigenous
Peoples Are Battling To Defend Their Lands—Often Paying the Ultimate Price,
GUARDIAN, June 12, 2009, at 26; Clash Over Peru Irrigation Project Kills One, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2010, at A8; Ruth Collins, The Spoils of Peru’s Mines: Peru is Profiting
from Mineral Wealth, But Risks Foreign Investors Riding Roughshod Over the Rights of
Indigenous Andean Peoples, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2010, 11:00 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/aug/31/peru-miningindigenous-rights.
11. This is as opposed to hydrocarbon extraction, forestry, or other resource extraction activities. See DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO, INFORME EXTRAORDINARIO: LOS
CONFLICTOS SOCIOAMBIENTALES POR ACTIVIDADES EXTRACTIVAS EN EL PERÚ 77 (2007),
available
at
http://sinia.minam.gob.pe/index.php?accion=verElemento&idElementoInformacion=381
&verPor=&idTipoElemento=37&idTipoFuente=477.
12. The term Campesino Community was introduced in 1969 to replace the term
“Indigenous Communities” in reference to those communities that live primarily in the
Peruvian Andes. Decreto Ley No. 17716, Ley de Reforma Agraria [Agrarian Reform
Law] ch. III, DIARIO OFICIAL EL PERUANO [EL PERUANO], 25 June 1969 (Peru), available
at http://sisbib.unmsm.edu.pe/bibvirtualdata/libros/2007/legis_per/cap03.pdf.
13. ANTHONY BEBBINGTON ET AL., PERU SUPPORT GRP., MINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN
PERU: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RIO BLANCO PROJECT, PIURA, at iv (2007) [hereinafter BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU].
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establishes communal property rights, autonomous communal selfgovernment, and protected cultural institutions.14 As such, two common
issues underlie many of the conflicts between Campesino communities
and mining companies: the question of whether or not the affected communities consented to mining development and the concern that the
wealth generated by mining has not sufficiently benefited local communities.15
In the face of widespread organized opposition to mining, transnational
companies increasingly employ a mix of public police services and private security companies to protect their investment interests.16 These
14. Decreto Supremo No. 37-70-AG, Estatuto Especial de Comunidades Campesinas
[Special Statute for Campasino Communities] 17 Feb. 1970 (Peru), available at
http://sisbib.unmsm.edu.pe/bibvirtual/libros/2007/legis_per/contenido.htm; Ley No.
24656, 13 Apr. 1987, Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas [General Law of Campesino Communities] EL PERUANO, 14 Apr. 1987 (Peru), available at
http://www.cepes.org.pe/legisla/ley24656.htm; Ley No. 24657, 13 Apr. 1987, Declaran
de Necesidad Nacional e Interes Social el Deslinde y la Titulacion del Territorio de las
Comunidades Campesinas [Declaration of the National Need and Social Interest of the
Territory of the Campesino Communities] EL PERUANO, 14 Apr. 1987 (Peru), available
at http://www.cepes.org.pe/legisla/ley24657.htm.
15. These issues have been central to each of the high profile mining related conflicts
in Peru in the recent years including the Tambogrande conflict in 2002, see Boyd, supra
note 7; José de Echave, Canadian Mining Companies Investments in Peru: The Tambogrande Case and the Need to Implement Reforms, COOPERACCION, secs. 1–3 (Frank
Berinstein
trans.,
Apr.
2005),
available
at
http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/miningwatch.ca/files/Peru_case_study_0.pdf,
the
Quilish conflict in 2004, see THE DEVIL OPERATION (Guarango Cine y Video 2010), the
Majaz conflict in 2005 and 2006, see Paola Tejada, [Interview] A Closer Look into the
Minera Majaz Mining Conflict, INDYMEDIA.BE BLOG (Apr. 3, 2007, 5:54 PM),
http://www.indymedia.be/index.html%3Fq=node%252F8365.html, the Combayo conflict
in 2006, see Milagros Salazar, Leaching Out the Water with the Gold, IPS NEWS (Sept.
30, 2006), http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34805, and the Bagua conflict in
2009, see Naomi Mapstone, Bagua’s Indigenous Protest One Year Later, AM. Q. BLOG
(June 7, 2010), http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/1588.
16. Mauricio Lazala, Private Military and Security Companies and their Impacts on
Human Rights in Contexts Other Than War, Conference on Private Military Contractors
in Latin America at the Havens Center (Jan. 2008), available at
www.havenscenter.org/files/Lazala%20Paper_0.doc; see Chairperson-Rapporteur of the
Working Grp. on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights & Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, Rep. on the Mission to
Peru, U.N. Human Rights Council, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7/Add.2 (Feb. 4, 2008) (by
José Luis Gómez del Prado) [hereinafter Rep. on the Mission to Peru], available at
http://www.unwg.rapn.ru/en/4/Country%20Visits/G0810419.pdf; Charis Kamphuis,
Derecho y la Convergencia del Poder Público y el Poder Empresarial: La Desposesión
Campesina y La Coerción Privatizada en el Perú, 15 REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE
DERECHO SOCIAL (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Kamphuis, Derecho y la Convergencia
del Poder Público y el Poder Empresarial]. See generally Fred Schreier & Marina Capa-
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practices, and their interface with international and domestic law, are
examined in this Article. The Introduction begins with an analytical description of the domestic legal regime that structures security services in
Peru. In this context, a case study of Forza is undertaken.17 This section
presents the allegations raised against Forza in three on-going cases:
Majaz,18 GRUFIDES,19 and Business Track.20 These cases depict the
deep interpenetration of the economic and political power of foreignowned mining companies, Forza, and the Peruvian justice system.21 By
tracing the legal trajectories of each case, this Article reveals a pattern of
impunity for foreign investors and their security companies.
Taking the discrete empirical context of the Forza case study as its reference, Part II studies impunity’s legal contours by questioning how it is
constituted in the midst of multiple systems of international and domestic
law. At the domestic level, it discusses the legal mechanisms that have
jurisdiction over the transnational actors profiled in the Forza case study.
At the international level, it considers three distinct normative systems:
public international human rights law, private international foreign investment law, and corporate social responsibility mechanisms. This
overview provides insight into how the global gap22 in the domestic regulation of the transnational corporation and the enforcement of domestic
rini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice, and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies 39 (Geneva Ctr. Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Rep.
No. 6, Mar. 2005) (listing how private security companies are employed to guard mines
in many countries).
17. Forza is one of Peru’s oldest and most powerful private security companies, recently purchased by Securitas, a transnational security services corporation. See infra
notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
18. See Tejada, supra note 15.
19. See THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15.
20. See Ministerio Publico Fiscalía Superior Especializada en Criminalidad Organizada [Prosecutor’s Office Organized Crime Specialist], Exp. No. 527–2009, Delitos:
Interceptión Telefónica, Violacion de Correspondencia y Asociación Ilícita para Delinquir,
a
Señor
Presidente
(Jan.
27,
2011)
(Peru),
available
at
http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/webpanel/doc_int/doc17032011-165221.pdf [hereinafter
Peru Prosecutor’s Office].
21. See, e.g., THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15.
22. The regulation of the corporation by states around the globe is uneven, such that
in some spaces and places the corporation is subjected to effective regulation and enforcement, and in others regulation is weak, ineffective, or lacking. The effect is to produces “gaps” or zones across the globe where the corporation is regulated to a lesser degree by the state. Another term used to describe the same phenomena is “regime deficit.”
See Shedrack Agbakwa, A Line in the Sand: International (Dis)Order and the Impunity of
Non-State Corporate Actors in the Developing World, in THE THIRD WORLD AND
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION (Antony Anghie et al. eds.,
2003).
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law, together with asymmetry in the enforcement of international law,
function together to institutionalize and internationalize impunity in the
Forza case study.
In view of the stark—and apparently totalizing—nature of the system
of impunity described in Part II, this Article concludes by exploring the
potential value of its own methodological approach. With this objective,
Part III revisits the Forza case study in terms of a methodology of international lawyering and legal academic work on the issue of corporate
impunity. The approach responds to some of the imperatives of certain
critical international law scholars23 and, most importantly, to the practical
needs of social movements adversely affected by the privatization of coercive force in favor of foreign investors. This focus ultimately invites
advocates to contemplate the possibility that the invocation of voluntary
corporate social responsibility mechanisms may risk broader political
pitfalls.
I. TRANSNATIONAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION AND THE PRIVATIZATION
OF COERCION
A. Domestic Legal Framework and Practice
Academics doing research in diverse contexts have widely observed
that the proliferation of private security companies is one consequence
that flows from neoliberal law and policy reform and the reduction of
public expenditure.24 The findings of a recent report issued by a United
Nations Working Group (“UNWG”)25 suggest that this hypothesis is
supported by the Peruvian experience.26 Since sweeping neoliberal policy
reforms were introduced in Peru in the early 1990s, the State has not in-

23. The specific authors referenced in Part III are Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Bhupinder
Chimni, Martti Koskenniemi, and David Kennedy.
24. Bonnie Campbell, Good Governance, Security and Mining in Africa, 21 MINS. &
ENERGY–RAW MATERIALS REP. 31, 35–37 (2006); Alexis P. Kontos, ‘Private’ Security
Guards: Privatized Force and State Responsibility under International Human Rights
Law, 4 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT’L L. 199, 199–200 (2004) [hereinafter Kontos, ‘Private’
Security Guards]; Mark Ungar, The Privatization of Citizen Security in Latin America:
From Elite Guards to Neighborhood Vigilantes, 34 SOC. JUST. 20, 20 (2007); Robert P.
Weiss, From Cowboy Detectives to Soldiers of Fortune: Private Security Contracting
and Its Contradictions on the New Frontiers of Capitalist Expansion, 34 SOC. JUST. 1, 8,
9 (2007).
25. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, at 16.
26. See generally Kontos, ‘Private’ Security Guards, supra note 24, at 199; Ungar,
supra note 24, at 20.
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creased the ranks of the public police force, while conversely the number
of private security personnel has expanded tremendously.27
The United Nations (“UN”) study estimated that in 2008 there were
100,000 private security guards in Peru, outnumbering the 92,000 public
police officers.28 It also concluded that approximately half of the private
security guards in Peru work for companies in the informal sector.29
While the report itself does not define the term “informal,” it can reasonably be assumed that the term refers to companies that have not registered their operations with the appropriate ministry. If this is the case,
these companies essentially operate illegally, given that the applicable
legislation requires registration.30 The possibility that approximately half
of the private security sector in Peru operates informally, and perhaps
even illegally, suggests that the State may be either unable or unwilling
to exercise effective regulatory control over the sector.31
The lack of formal regulatory control over the private security sector is
contrasted by the UNWG study’s observation of the close informal relationship between the private security sector, the police force, and the military:
In many cases, these companies are run by former members of the
Armed Forces or the Police, or they occupy senior positions. Peru also
seems to experience the “revolving door” syndrome whereby, when
they retire, members of the military and police are hired by private security companies or start their own. The Ministry of the Interior apparently authorizes these companies to hire off-duty police officers to protect buildings; the officer’s weapon is the property of the police, not of
the company.32

Thus it would appear that the private security industry in Peru is defined,
rather ironically, first, by its high degree of illegality and second, by its
close, informal relationship with the military and the police.
In this context, the relevant provisions of the corresponding Peruvian
legal regime are pertinent. In 1994, Fujimori’s neoliberal reforms included the introduction of Peru’s first law with the stated objective of regulat-

27. See Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, ¶¶ 37, 39, 40, 44.
28. Id. ¶¶ 40, 44.
29. Id. ¶ 12.
30. All private security companies must register themselves in accordance with an
array of administrative specifications. See Ley No. 28879, 17 Aug. 2006, Ley de Servicios de Seguridad Privada [Private Security Services Act] arts. 4, 23, EL PERUANO, 18
Aug. 2006 (Peru) [hereinafter Private Security Services Act (Peru)].
31. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, ¶¶ 12, 44.
32. Id. ¶ 40.
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ing the private security services.33 In 2006 the Private Security Services
Act34 (“the Act”) replaced the initial 1994 law to form the current legislative context.35
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Act facilitates police and military officers’ access to employment in the private security sector.36 The Ministry
of the Interior is responsible for the regulation, control, and supervision
of all three institutions37 and authorizes the operation of privately owned
Private Security Training Centers, which security personnel are required
to attend.38 However, police or military officers may bypass this training
requirement because Centers are empowered to recognize the equivalency of police or military training.39 The Act explicitly allows retired military or police officers to supervise private security companies40 and does
not prohibit these companies from employing actively serving police/military officers.41
While the Act facilitates the integration of the public security labor
force into the private sector, it nonetheless imposes a certain division of
labor on these officers as they cross between private and publicly paid
positions.42 Private security companies are prohibited from performing
functions within the jurisdiction of the military or the police, such as the
investigation of crime and espionage.43 However, despite this prohibition, in exceptional circumstances, private security officers may be required to support, collaborate with, and help the police force.44 However,
when doing so, the Act stipulates that these private officers do not acquire the legal status of public authorities.45
The privatization of the Peruvian police force extends beyond the parameters of the Act. In 2009, a regulation was introduced by the national
legislature that allows the National Director of the police force to enter
into service provision agreements with private institutions, including
33. See Decreto Supremo No. 005-94-IN, 12 May 1994, Aprueban el Reglamento de
Servicios de Seguridad Privada [Approval of the Regulation of Private Security Services], ch. XIII, EL PERUANO, 13 May 1994 (Peru).
34. Private Security Services Act (Peru), supra note 30.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. 3.
38. Id. art. 23.1(e).
39. Id. art. 27.3.
40. Id. art. 27.2.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id. arts. 24(c)–(e), 29.
44. Id. art. 38.
45. Id. arts. 23.1(j), 28, 38.
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transnational mining companies.46 These agreements provide a framework whereby individual police officers provide services to private companies on their days off.47
The Peruvian National Police force’s website displays a scanned copy
of one such agreement.48 It is a 2009 contract signed by the General of
the National Police Force and a representative of the Japanese-owned
Santa Luisa Mining Company.49 However, since this is the only publicly
available copy of an agreement of this type, it is difficult to determine
how widespread these agreements are in the extractive industry. The information gathered in an ongoing journalistic investigation50 suggests
that between 2008 and 2010 approximately thirty-three such agreements
between the police force and transnational mining companies were in
place across Peru.51 The terms of the agreements collected in this journalistic investigation52 are similar to those of the Santa Luisa agreement,
described below, and they also coincide with what is publicly known

46. Decreto Supremo No. 004-2009-IN, 11 July 2009, Decreto Supremo que Aprueba
el Reglamento de Prestacion de Servicios Extraordinarios Complementarios a la Funcion
Policial [Supreme Decree that Approves the Regulation of the Provision of Services that
are Exceptional and Complimentary to Police Duties] arts. 1, 4, 5 (Peru), available at
http://www.mininter.gob.pe/admin/archivos/legales/13122009222005_reglamento_funcio
n_policial.pdf.
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., Convenio De Cooperación para la prestación de Servicios Extraordinarios Complementarios a la Función Policial entre la compañía Minera Santa Luisa S.A. y
La Policía Nacional Del Perú [Cooperation Agreement between Mining Company Santa
Luisa S.A. and the Peruvian National Police Force for the Provision of Services that are
Exceptional and Complimentary to Police Duties], para. 4.1.2 [hereinafter Santa Luisa
Agreement],
available
at
http://www.pnp.gob.pe/transparencia/documentos/CONVENIO%20STA%20LUISA&20
SA%20–%20PNP.pdf.
49. Compañía Minera Santa Luisa S.A. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co. Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan. Cia Minera Santa Luisa S.A., DATOSPERU.ORG,
http://www.datosperu.org/peru-cia-minera-santa-luisa-sa.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
It carries out zinc and lead mining activities in the Andean region of Ancash. Id.
50. Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48.
51. Jacqueline Fowks, IDL REPORTERO, http://idl-reporteros.pe/ (forthcoming). The
author has copies of seven such agreements between mining companies and the police
force on file. Agreements between Peruvian National Police and Industrias Cachimayo,
S.A. (Oct. 23, 2007 & Oct. 24, 2009), Minera Yanacocha, S.R.L. (June 13, 2009), La
Empresa Minera Sougang Hierro Peru, S.A.A. (Oct. 21, 2009); Compañía Minera Antamina, S.A. (July 1, 2009), La Empresa Conirsa, S.A (July 10, 2006), and Gold Fields
La Cima, S.A. (Jan. 11, 2010) (on file with author).
52. Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48.
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about other arrangements of its kind.53 As such, it would seem that the
Santa Luisa agreement is at least somewhat representative of the general
nature of the agreements being made between police and mining companies in Peru.
The Santa Luisa agreement, entitled “Cooperation Agreement for the
Provision of Services that are Exceptional and Complementary to Police
Duties,” founds its existence on the constitutional duty of the police force
to “maintain order”54 and has three named objectives. First, it aims to
offer Santa Luisa “exceptional police services, complementary to [ordinary] police duties, utilizing the human resources of the Peruvian National Police.”55 Second, the police are to “detect and neutralize” any
risks that threaten the personnel or property of the mining company,56
therefore guaranteeing the normal development of mining activities.
Third, the agreement serves to generate the financial and logistical support that the police force requires to fulfill its institutional goals in service of the wider community.57 The agreement is drafted like a private
contract in that it contains a privative clause specifically stating that controversies are to be resolved directly between the parties.58
In this framework, the police force commits to providing the mining
company with officers from the Special Operations Division, which is
notable for the reason that this division is trained to lead operations
against drug trafficking, subversion, and violent conflict.59 The commit53. The terms of the Santa Luisa agreement coincide with a description of Yanacocha’s agreement with the police force. Compare GINO COSTA, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW
OF MINERA YANACOCHA’S POLICIES BASED ON THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2009) (describing terms of the agreement between the police
force and Yanacocha), with Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48 (actual terms of the
agreement between the Santa Luisa Mining Company and the police force).
54. Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48, paras. 1.2, 2, 3, 3.1, 3.2. The fundamental
objective of the National Police is to guarantee, maintain, and reestablish the internal
order; to offer protection and help to people and to the community; to guarantee the observance of the laws and the security of private and public property; to prevent, investigate, and combat crime; and to control the borders. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL
PERÚ [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU] [C.P.], Dec. 29, 1993, art. 166, translated at
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/_ingles/CONSTITUTION_29_08_08.pdf.
55. “Exceptional police services, complementary to [ordinary] police duties, utilizing
the human resources of the Peruvian National Police” is the author’s translation of the
Spanish phrase “servicio policial extraordinario complementario a la función policial con
los recursos humanos de la Policía Nacional del Perú,” appearing in the Santa Luisa
Agreement. See Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48, para. 2.
56. Id. para. 3.1.
57. Id. para. 3.2.
58. Id. para. 8.
59. Id. paras. 3.1, 4.1.2.
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ment on the part of the police force is to furnish the company with a rotating force of uniformed and armed off-duty police officers to protect
the mine site twenty-four hours a day.60 In exchange, the mining company agrees to provide the off-duty officers with residence, food, life insurance, health care, and a daily salary.61 Further, the company provides the
police force as an institution with two different types of financial payments.62 The first is equivalent to twenty percent of the total salaries paid
to individual officers,63 and the second constitutes an unspecified amount
designated to assist the police force in the fulfillment of its overall institutional objectives.64
To date, the constitutionality of the privatized funding and service arrangements described above remains unscrutinized by academics and
activists alike. The Peruvian Constitution states that the funds designated
for police force logistics must be used exclusively toward institutional
ends under the control of the designated public authority.65 It is unclear
that the “exceptional” services offered to Santa Luisa fall within the
scope of the “institutional ends” contemplated by the Constitution, which
include offering protection and help to people and to the community.66
According to one Peruvian law professor’s reading of the Constitution,
an agreement of this nature violates the rights of all Peruvians to equal
police protection and security to the extent that it compromises the constitutional tenet that the exercise of police power must respect the principle of neutrality between institutions and sectors in society.67
Taking into account the terms of the Santa Luisa agreement together
with the findings of the UNWG study and the applicable legislative
framework, some general conclusions can be drawn in regard to security
in the Peruvian resource extraction context. First, it is clear that security
services are being reorganized in accordance with a number of processes
of privatization—in ways that are not yet fully understood. Second, law
and practice facilitate the provision of a particular set of coercive resources to transnational mining companies. These resources consist of
private security companies that are staffed by former and active police

60. Id. para. 4.1.3.
61. Id. paras. 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.5, 4.2.6.
62. Id. paras. 4.2.8, 4.2.10.
63. Id. para. 4.2.8.
64. Id. para. 4.2.10.
65. C.P. art. 170 (Peru).
66. Id. arts. 166, 170.
67. Pedro P. Grandez Castro, El Derecho a la Seguridad Ciudadana y los Procesos
de Privatización en el Perú: Un Acercamiento Conceptual, GCST: NEW VOICES SERIES
(forthcoming) (on file with the author).
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and military personnel. Further, these resources include fleets of off-duty
police officers organized to function like a private security force pursuant
to private agreements. Third, public security institutions have adapted
their policies and practices to compensate for their apparent lack of public funds. Peruvian law created mechanisms whereby mining companies
may fund the police force as an institution and also supplement the income of individual officers.
These observations suggest that the police force, both as an institution
and as a labor force, has been partially privatized in the service of mining
companies. As described above, the demand generated by mining companies for security services must be understood in the context of the
widespread observation that the increase in resource extraction in Peru
has encountered growing community-based opposition,68 or in the words
of the Santa Luisa agreement, “risks.”69 In the course of these conflicts,
companies—not communities—have the economic resources to generate
a market demand for security services. Security services such as those
offered in the Santa Luisa agreement are employed to physically protect
the property of foreign investors. This is especially salient because the
source of conflict between mining companies and communities often
relates to the fundamental issue of land and land rights.70
However, the UNWG recently tied security companies in Peru to a
“new development.”71 Specifically, they have become implicated in the
surveillance, coercion, harassment, and intimidation of human rights organizations with a particular focus on defending the economic, social,
and environmental rights of mining-affected communities.72 Thus the
coercive relationship between private security companies and communities has two dimensions, namely the classical function of protecting
property, “new” practices of surveillance, and even political persecu68. See BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13; José De Echave,
Mining and Communities in Perú: Constructing a Framework for Decision-Making, in
COMMUNITY RIGHTS AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: CANADIAN MINING AND OIL
COMPANIES IN LATIN AMERICA 17, 17 (Liisa North, et al. eds., 2006).
69. See, e.g., Santa Luisa Agreement, supra note 48, para. 3.1.
70. See Kamphuis, Derecho y la Convergencia del Poder Público y el Poder Empresarial, supra note 16; Carlos Meléndez Guerrero, Movilización sin Movimientos: El Caso
de los Conflictos Entre Comunidades y la Empresa Minera Yanacocha en Cajamarca
[Mobilization without Movement: The Case of Conflicts between Communities and the
Mining Company Yanacocha in Cajamarca], in ROMERO GROMPONE & MARTIN TANAKA,
ENTRE EL CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO Y LA INSATISFACCIÓN SOCIAL: LAS PROTESTAS
SOCIALES EN EL PERÚ ACTUAL [BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL
DISSATISFACTION: SOCIAL PROTESTS IN PERU TODAY] 321 (2009).
71. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, ¶ 7.
72. Id. ¶¶ 7, 48–49, 72.
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tion.73 Further, there is a strong indication that these dimensions coexist
with a third feature of private security services in the Peruvian extractive
industry, namely that these services are linked to a coordinated coalition
of foreign governments and transnational corporations who are concerned with monitoring and strategically debilitating mining related social movements. This study of Forza, one of Peru’s most important and
powerful security companies, allows for a detailed exploration of each of
these three dimensions.
B. Case Study: The Forza Security Company
Forza was created in 1991 by retired personnel from the Peruvian
Armed Forces who specialized in subversion and espionage work.74 Forza’s objective is to offer complete corporate security services to diverse
companies with a specialization in the industrial, mining, and energy sectors.75 In addition to its work for transnational mining companies, Forza’s clients span an impressive array of high-profile international organizations, including the British Embassy, the Inter-American Development
Bank, the Standard Bank London Limited, as well as subsidiaries of CocaCola, Eli Lilly, and Hewlett Packard.76 As Forza became one of Peru’s
most important and powerful private security companies, its status garnered the interest of Securitas, one of the largest multinational private
security corporation in the world.77 Due to Forza’s “prestige, experience
73. See id. ¶¶ 7, 41, 43, 46, 72.
74. Forza, S.A.: Private Company Snapshot, BLOOMBURG BUSINESSWEEK,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=39129
768 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Edmundo Cruz & César Romero, Diablo, CAJAMARCA,
http://www.cajamarca.de/mine/reglaje2.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
http://www.securitas.com/pe/es-pe/About75. Securitas
Perú,
SECURITAS,
Us/Securitas-Peru (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
76. SECURITAS AB, Securitas in brief, in SECURITAS ANNUAL REPORT 2010 (2010).
Securitas services a wide range of customers in a variety of industries and customer segments, ranging from governments, airports, infrastructure, office,
banks, shopping centers, hotels, manufacturing industries, mining industries,
hospitals and residential areas to high-tech and IT companies. The size of the
customers varies from the ‘shop on the corner’ to global multi-billion industries.
Id.
77. Securitas has 12 percent of the global market share and employs over 240,000
individuals to offer services in over 40 countries on every continent. Acerca de Securitas
AB [About Securitas AB], SECURITAS, http://www.securitas.com/pe/es-pe/AboutUs/Historia (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Company Profile: Securitas, APRODEX,
http://www.aprodex.com/securitas-931-l.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter
Company Profile: Securitas].
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and position in the Peruvian market,” Securitas acquired Forza in 2007 as
part of its expansion into Latin America.78
Ironically, Forza’s power and status as the security company of choice
in Peru for a significant number of international organizations and corporations seem to be proportionate to its growing reputation as a systematic
human rights violator. The following section describes three ongoing
legal proceedings that allege Forza systematically violated the human
rights of activists and human rights defenders working on mining issues
in Peru.79 The cases are presented in chronological order of the incidents
they represent.
1. Majaz: Protection of “Private” Property
The Rio Blanco project, located in a “cloud forest” in the Peruvian
Andes between 2,200 and 2,800 meters above sea level, is one of the
largest undeveloped copper resources in the world.80 It has the potential
to become one of the largest copper mines in South America and to create momentum for the creation of a larger “mining district.”81 In 2003 the
British company Monterrico Metals acquired the exploration rights to the
Rio Blanco project.82 Monterrico began operations in Peru through its
wholly owned subsidiary Minera Majaz, whose name has since been
changed to Rio Blanco.83 In 2007 the Chinese conglomerate Xiamen Zijin Tongguan Investment Development Company bought the capital
share of Monterrico.84
Majaz’s exploratory operations at the Rio Blanco site were conducted
on the communally owned territory of two Campesino Communities.85
These activities occurred without the permission of these Communities

78. Acerca de Securitas Perú [About Securitas Peru], SECURITAS,
http://www.securitas.com/pe/es-pe/About-Us/Securitas-Peru (last visited Feb. 3, 2012)
[hereinafter About Securitas Peru].
79. See Tejada, supra note 15; THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15; Peru Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 20.
80. BEBBINGTON, ET AL., supra note 13, at iv, v, 15; Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals
PLC, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475 [3] (Eng.).
81. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [3] (Eng.); BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV.
IN PERU, supra note 13, at iv.
82. Emily Russell, Monterrico Acquires 100% Interest in Rio Blanco, BUS. NEWS
AM.
(Peru)
(Apr.
3,
2003,
3:35
PM),
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/mining/Monterrico_acquires_100*_interest_in_Rio_Bl
anco.
83. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 15.
84. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [4] (Eng.).
85. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 15.
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and in violation of Peruvian and international human rights law.86 Although the affected Campesino Communities repeatedly and clearly notified state and mining authorities of their opposition to the project, these
efforts were met with “profound deficiencies” on the part of national authorities.87 In response to the extreme level of social conflict in the region, an independent delegation of UK experts—including one Member
of Parliament—was created to engage in an in-depth evaluation of the
social, political, cultural, environmental, and economic issues raised by
the Rio Blanco project.88 The delegation concluded that “non-violent
protest and the democratic process [had] completely failed local populations.”89
In 2004 community members marched on the Rio Blanco mine site,
and one Campesino was killed in a confrontation with police.90 No police
officers have been prosecuted or found responsible for this death.91 A
second march began in late July 2005 with the participation of between
two and three thousand Campesino leaders and communal authorities
from across the region.92 This march was initiated because mining authorities failed to respond to an ultimatum from Communities demanding
the cessation of exploration.93 Marchers referred to it as the “sacrifice
march”94 because they walked for several days through difficult terrain
toward the Rio Blanco mine site.95 The protesters marched unarmed and
waving white flags,96 with the expectation of negotiating with a special
high-level commission of civil society leaders to be flown in by helicopter.97 The Ministry of Mining requested the formation of the commission
in order to facilitate negotiations between marchers, Majaz, and state
authorities.98 However, unexpectedly, the commission’s helicopter was
86. Id. at 24–25 (noting that this conclusion was reached in a report issued by the
Peruvian Ombudsperson’s Office in April 2006).
87. Id. at vi, 51.
88. Id. at 20.
89. Id. at vi, 51.
90. Id. at 17.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 17, 18.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475, [15(i)] (Eng.).
95. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 18; Jennifer
Moore, Peru: Piura Votes, A Dangerous Precedent, UPSIDE DOWN WORLD (Sept. 16,
2008 4:29 AM), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/peru-archives-76/1479-peru-piuravotes-a-dangerous-precedent.
96. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [15(v)] (Eng.).
97. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at iv, 18; Guerrero,
[2009] EWHC (QB) at [15(ii)]–[15(v)] (Eng.).
98. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 21 n.50.
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grounded a short distance from the mine site and police prevented its
members from proceeding to the site.99
With the delegation grounded nearby, the marchers’ campsite was allegedly bombed with tear gas from helicopters and raided by Forza and
police officers.100 Approximately twenty-eight Campesino leaders were
detained and brought to the mine site.101 The shocking claims of these
Campesinos regarding the ensuing events were finally substantiated over
three years later when photographs depicting officers engaged in cruel
acts of abuse and torture of the Campesino detainees102 were leaked to a
national newspaper in late 2008 by an anonymous source.103 Officers
bound the Campesinos, placed sacks over their heads, and forced them to
walk barefoot.104 Their clothes were completely or partially removed and
they were savagely beaten, tortured, subjected to tear gas, and deprived
of food and water.105 One Campesino did not survive these events.106
Two female detainees reported being subjected to sexual abuse.107 After
three days of torture in captivity, the Campesino detainees were released
and charged with crimes such as terrorism.108
99. Id. at 18–19 & 21 n.49.
100. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [15(iv)]–[15(v)] (Eng.); THE DEVIL OPERATION,
supra note 15.
101. THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15.
102. Id.
103. Elízabeth Prado, En Majaz sí se Torturo el Año 2005 [Yes Torture Occurred at
Majaz in 2005], LA REPUBLICA (Peru), Jan. 9, 2009, at 16; Fernandoch, Photographs
Confirm Torture of Peasants who Protested against Majaz Mining, BLOG.DHPERU.ORG
(Jan. 9, 2009, 6:27 PM), http://blog.dhperu.org/?p=1873; Nat’l Human Rights Coordinator & Ecumenical Found. for Dev. & Peace [FEDEPAZ], Fotografías demostrarían que
seguridad de minera Majaz torturó a pobladores [Photographs Demonstrate that Majaz
Mining Security Services Tortured Villagers], FEDEPAZ (June 1, 2009),
www.fedepaz.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=101&Itemid=18; see
also THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15.
104. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [15(x)], [15(xi)] (Eng.); THE DEVIL OPERATION,
supra note 15.
105. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [7], [15(x)], [15(xi)], [15(xv)] (Eng.); THE
DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15.
106. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [7] (Eng.). It is disputed whether this individual
was killed in confrontations at the protestors’ campsite, or as a result of the mistreatment
that occurred at the mine site.
107. Id. at [7] (Eng.); THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15.
108. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [7] (Eng.); Elízabeth Prado, Instancia Internacional Vería Torturas en Majaz [International Forum will Investigate Majaz Tortures], LA
REPUBLICA (Peru), Jan. 14, 2009, at 4; Edmundo Cruz, Defender el Medio Ambiente es
Delito de Terrorismo en Minas del Norte de Perú [Defending the Environment is a Crime
of Terrorism in the Northern Mines of Peru], LA REPUBLICA (Peru), (May 10, 2008),
available at http://www.cajamarca.de/mine/torturas-majaz.pdf; see also Guerrero, [2009]
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In June 2008 a group of lawyers at the Peruvian NGO FEDEPAZ filed
a complaint to the Prosecutions Office requesting an investigation of the
Forza security officers, police officers, and mine officials allegedly responsible for the crimes committed against the detained Campesinos.109
In spite of the supporting photographic evidence, the local prosecutor
rejected the complaint and closed the investigation.110 This closure was
successfully appealed and in April 2009 the Prosecutions Appeals Office
ordered that the investigations be reopened.111 At this stage, a prominent
national newspaper reported that the investigation and prosecution had
been impeded by the refusal of the police force to provide the names of
the officers who participated in the police operation in question, as well
as the refusal of Majaz to provide a list of the mine staff—including Forza personnel—on site at the time.112
One year later, in April 2010, the local prosecutor closed the investigation for a second time.113 After another appeal, the Appeals Office again
EWHC (QB) at [15(iv)] (Eng.). After more than three years of proceedings, these criminal charges were finally dropped. Primer Juzgado Mixto De Huancabamba Dispone el
Sobreseimiento del Proceso Penal Seguido contra Comuneros y Ronderos de la Comunidad Campesina de Segunda y Cajas [The First Court of Huancabamba Dismisses Criminal Proceedings Against Members of the Segunda y Cajas Campesina Community],
FEDEPAZ,
http://www.fedepaz.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=134&Itemid=18
(last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
109. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [15], [15(xiv)] (Eng.).
110. Id. at [15(xvi)]; THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15.
111. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [15(xvi)] (Eng.); THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra
note 15. The Campesinos’ lawyers later brought charges against the local prosecutor,
Lorenzo Félix Toledo Leiva, for his failure to prosecute the tortures. In November 2011
the national prosecutor authorized a preparatory investigation against Mr. Toledo Leiva
for failing to prosecute the tortures even though he was aware of their occurrence. See
Fiscal de la Nación autoriza a que se formalice investigación preparatoria para juicio a
(Nov.
11,
2011),
ex
fiscal
provincial
de
Huancabamba,
FEDEPAZ
http://www.fedepaz.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=169&Itemid=18.

112. THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15; Francesca Garcia, Policía No Brinda los
Nombres de los Posibles Responsables [Police Fail to Provide Names of the Officers
Who Might Be Responsible], LA REPUBLICA (Peru), Jan. 12, 2009, at 6; PERU 21, Aún No
Dan los Nombres de Policías que Habrían Torturado a Campesinos de Majaz [Still No
Release of the Names of the Police Who Might Have Tortured Campesinos at Majaz],
FEDEPAZ
(Jan.
31,
2009),
http://fedepaz.org/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=95.
113. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [15(xvi)] (Eng.); Fiscalia Ordena Continuar
con Investigación por Caso de Torturas a Comuneros en Piura [Prosecutor’s Office Orders the Continuation of the Investigation of the Torture of Community Members],
(Sept.
1,
2010),
FEDEPAZ
http://www.fedepaz.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=113&Itemid=1
[hereinafter Research Continues in Torture Cases].
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ordered that the investigation be reopened in August 2010.114 The appeals prosecutor pointed out that the local prosecutor had failed to take
into consideration that the police officers detained the victims and subjected them to torture and other crimes while carrying out a police operation that was likely previously planned by high level police Commanders.115 As of the writing of this article, the domestic investigation continues.116
In 2009 the victims brought parallel proceedings against Monterrico
and its Peruvian subsidiary before the English High Court.117 Their case
alleged that the company’s directors, managers, and personnel directly
participated in events related to the torture and detainment of the Campesino marchers.118 The victims claimed that Monterrico was liable under
the British Private International Law Act119 for failing to fulfill its “responsibility for risk management.”120 They also claimed that both Monterrico and its subsidiary were liable under the Peruvian Civil Code for
culpable or intentional damages on the basis of willful misconduct, failure to take adequate steps to prevent known risks, and actions of their
employees (vicariously), including Forza security guards.121 Finally, the
victims made a claim for negligence.122
The nature of Majaz’s security arrangement was a major issue of contention in the UK action. It was clear that Majaz employed Forza to provide the Rio Blanco site with security services and that both Forza and
police officers were at the mine site when the torture and abuse of protestors occurred.123 The victims testified that both Forza officers and police
officers participated in the acts of torture, detention, and cruelty.124 The
company alleged that Forza officers refrained from such behavior and

114. Research Continues in Torture Cases, supra note 113.
115. Id.
116. Casa Matriz de Minera Majaz S.A. Indemniza a 33 Campesinos, FEDEPAZ (July
20,
2011),
http://www.fedepaz.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=139&Itemid=18.

117. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [8], [10], [45] (Eng.).
118. THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15; Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [8], [10],
[45] (Eng.); see also Bristow se niega a responder por supuestas orden que dio para
torturar a comuneros [Bristow Refuses to Comment on the Alleged Order that he Gave to
Torture Community Members], COORDINADOR NACIONAL DE RADIO (Jan. 14, 2009),
http://www.cnr.org.pe/noticia.php?id=24703.
119. Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, c. 42 (U.K.).
120. Id. § 12.
121. Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at 2475 [9]–[10] (Eng.).
122. Id. at [10].
123. Id. at [25].
124. Id. at [10], [16].

2012]FOREIGN INVESTMENT & PRIVITIZATION OF COERCION 547
that any wrongdoing was solely committed by police officers, for which
the company was not liable.125 Unfortunately, it was difficult to identify
the institutional identity of some of the officers on the basis of the photographic evidence because the officers were not always fully uniformed or
their uniforms were not always fully visible.126
In terms of the institutional relationship between the company and the
police force, it is not known if Majaz had a security services agreement
with the police such as the one described in the previous section.127
However, at a minimum, the nature of police participation in the events
described above suggests a relationship of informal collaboration.128 The
company liaised with the police force to ensure the presence of hundreds
of officers from the Special Operations Division to protect the Rio Blanco site.129 In a statement to the press, a police general declared that Majaz
was not paying the police but that it was providing food and some transportation.130 Finally, the detention of the Campesino marchers occurred
on company property and officers allegedly used the company’s facilities
to carry out the logistics and coordination related to the detention and
torture.131
When the UK proceedings began in June 2009, the Court imposed a
worldwide freezing injunction to restrain Monterrico from removing any
of its assets up to the value of just over £5 million from the jurisdiction.132 In the months following, the Court held that the allegations
against Monterrico for responsibility and participation in the brutality
against the protestors constituted a “good arguable case”133 for the pur-

125. Id. at [25].
126. THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15.
127. See Brant McGee, The Community Referendum: Participatory Democracy and
the Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent to Development, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
570, 610–11 (2009).
128. See Guerrero, [2009] EWHC (QB) at [16] (Eng.).
129. Id. at [8], [15].
130. Id. at [10 g.].
131. Id. at [10], [15]. For example, the company provided the barefoot and seminude
detainees with rubber boots before they were transported from the mine site in helicopter.
Id. at [10 d.], [16]. There are allegations that some of the implements used to torture the
Campesinos were company property. Id. at [10 i.], [10 k.].
132. Id. at [6], [41]. Monterrico was also ordered to not diminish the value of any of its
assets within or outside the jurisdiction up to the same value and not to dispose of any of
its shares in its subsidiary, now called Rio Blanco. Id. at [6].
133. The claimants in Majaz had to prove that they had a “good arguable case” for the
purpose of obtaining an injunction against Monterrico that would prevent the company
from dealing with or disposing of any of its assets pending the determination of the case
against it. The “good arguable case” test is a low threshold.
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poses of upholding the injunction.134 However in July of that year, before
the October 2011 trial could take place, the claimants accepted an offer
from the company of monetary compensation without admitting liability
in return for the withdrawal of their claim.135
2. GRUFIDES: Political Persecution of Mining Activists
Minera Yanacocha, the largest gold mine in Latin America and one of
the most profitable in the world,136 began operations in 1992 in the Cajamarca region of the Peruvian Andes, located between 3,500 to 4,000
meters above sea level.137 Yanacocha is owned and operated by three
shareholders: the Peruvian Compañía de Minas Buenaventura and the
International Finance Corporation each hold a minority interest, while
the American Newmont Mining Corporation, the largest gold mining
company in the world, is the majority shareholder.138 Yanacocha has employed Forza since 1993 as its exclusive private security company.139
Yanacocha also has a confidential contract with the police force to provide security services similar to those described in the Santa Luisa
agreement.140
Like Majaz, Yanacocha also began its operations on the communally
owned territory of a Campesino Community.141 There is strong evidence
that Yanacocha acquired the portions of the land it now mines in violation of the Campesino Community’s land-rights protected by domestic
and international law.142 In addition to the problematic legal and political
134. Id. at [26]–[27].
135. Richard Meeran, Peruvian Torture Claimants Compensated by UK Mining Company, LEIGH DAY & CO (July 20, 2011), http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2011/July2011/Peruvian-torture-claimants-compensated-by-UK-minin.
136. Quiénes Somos [About Us], YANACOCHA, http://www.yanacocha.com.pe/lacompania/quienes-somos (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Yanacocha, About Us];
see Bury, supra note 3, at 50–56.
137. Yanacocha, About Us, supra note 136.
138. Id.
139. Grupo de formación e intervención para el desarrollo sostenible (GRUFIDES)
[Formation & Intervention Grp. for Sustainable Dev.] v. Peru, Petition Alleging Human
Rights Violation, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 32 (May 15, 2009) [hereinafter GRUFIDES Petition] (on file with the author).
140. See COSTA, supra note 53, at 9, 11, 14.
141. Yanacocha, About Us, supra note 136; see Bury, supra note 3, at 50.
142. Kamphuis, Derecho y la Convergencia del Poder Público y el Poder Empresarial, supra note 16, at 17–24, 36–46. The alleged violations relate to domestic legislation,
the Peruvian Constitution, the ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, and the OAS American Convention on Human Rights. See
C.P. arts. 7, 70–73, 88, 89 (Peru); International Labour Organisation [ILO], Convention
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, arts. 13–19, June 7,
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underpinnings of Yanacocha’s presence in the area,143 a recent study of
the United Nations (“UN”) Economic Commission on Latin America and
the Caribbean identified Yanacocha as one of the least successful industrial clusters in terms of its contribution to local development.144 With
these antecedents, it is not surprising that large-scale protests began in
1999 against Yanacocha’s expansion.145 These protests were essentially
grassroots uprisings of local Campesino Communities affected by Yanacocha’s activities.146
Two of these high-profile protests are particularly relevant. In 2004, a
Campesino-led general strike and road blockade occurred in the city of
Cajamarca. Ten thousand urban and rural residents engaged in this sustained protest for a period of two weeks.147 The size and strength of the
protests eventually forced Yanacocha to withdraw its planned expansion
to a nearby mountain called Quilish.148 In 2006, another protest against
Yanacocha sparked in the rural area of Combayo.149 Approximately 100
Campesinos blockaded Yanacocha’s use of a local highway while 500
Campesinos protested peacefully in the town square.150 In response,
Yanacocha deployed somewhere between 75 and 200 armed officers,
consisting of a mixture of Forza officers and off-duty police officers in
the employ of Yanacocha pursuant to a private agreement with the police
force.151 In the first few days of what became weeks of protest, a Campesino protestor was shot and killed, allegedly by police officers in the
1989, ILO No. 169, 28 I.L.M. 1384; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
143. For example there is evidence of high-level corruption between the Fujimori government and Yanacocha’s principle shareholder Newmont. Jane Perlez & Lowell Bergman, Tangled Strands in Fight over Peru Gold Mine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at A.
144. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 36.
145. Anthony Bebbington et al., Mining and Social Movements: Struggles over Livelihood and Rural Territorial Development in the Andes 36 WORLD DEV., no. 12, 2008 at
2895.
146. See id.
147. Lisa J. Laplante & Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for
Community Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
69, 104–05 (2008).
148. See id. at 105.
149. See Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16.
150. THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15.
151. Yanacocha Anuncia Suspensión Total de sus Actividades [Yanacocha Announces
the Complete Suspension of its Activities], LA REPUBLICA (Peru) (Aug. 28, 2006), available at http://peru.indymedia.org/news/2006/08/33496.php; Edgard Jara & Herbert Holguín, Han Tomado una Decisión Apresurada [They Made a Rushed Decision], LA
REPUBLICA (Peru) (Aug. 29, 2006, 2:00 AM), http://www.larepublica.pe/29-08-2006/hantomado-una-decision-apresurada.
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employ of Yanacocha.152 In an investigation of Forza’s warehouse, located on Yanacocha’s property, authorities allegedly found “war ammunition.”153 The possession of military-like weapons and ammunition by
private security companies is illegal under the Act154 and a violation of
the Peruvian Constitution.155
In each of the above instances of political deadlock between Campesino protestors and Yanacocha, state officials called upon members of the
local NGO GRUFIDES to mediate,156 with GRUFIDES earning the 2004
National Prize in Human Rights for its role in contributing to the peaceful resolution of the Quilish conflict.157 However, the rise in Campesino
organizing in Combayo in 2006 heralded the escalation of “Operación
Diablo”—a systematic program of digital surveillance, intimidation,
death threats, and defamation—which primarily targeted GRUFIDES
personnel, but also spanned approximately thirty other related local environmentalists and Campesino leaders.158 Later that same year, hit men
murdered one of the Campesino leaders identified in the surveillance
program as a “threat to Yanacocha.”159
The Peruvian justice system has refused to prosecute the perpetrators
of Operación Diablo.160 In 2009, GRUFIDES’ lawyers filed a petition
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), alleging that the Peruvian State violated its obligations under the American

152. Ángel Páez & Wilson Castro, ‘Forza’ no ha sido Exculpada [‘Forza’ Has Not
Been Exonerated], LA REPUBLICA (Peru) (Dec. 8, 2006, 2:00 AM),
http://www.larepublica.pe/08-12-2006/forza-no-ha-sido-exculpada; Milagros Salazar, El
último Guardián de las Aguas [The Last Guardian of the Water], LA REPUBLICA (Peru)
(Sept. 10, 2006), http://www.larepublica.pe/10-09-2006/el-ultimo-guardian-de-las-aguas.
153. Páez & Castro, supra note 152. The designation war ammunition is given to ammunition according its size and type. Id.
154. Private Security Services Act (Peru), supra note 30, art. 36.1.
155. C.P. art. 175 (Peru).
156. Milagros Salazar, Yanacocha amenaza con paralizar todas sus operaciones si
continúan protestas [Yanacocha Threatens to Halt All Operations if Protests Continue],
LA REPUBLICA (Peru) (Aug. 28, 2006, 2:00 AM), http://www.larepublica.pe/28-082006/yanacocha-amenaza-con-paralizar-todas-sus-operaciones-si-continuan-protestas.
157. See Jennifer Stein, Peru: Arana Awarded Human Rights Award, GLOBAL
GREENGRANTS FUND (Jan. 23, 2005), http://www.greengrants.org/2005/01/23/peru-aranaawarded-human-rights-award.
158. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16
159. Id. at 18–19; Andres A. H. Knight, A Un Año del Asesinato del Líder Ecologista
Esmundo Becerra [One Year since the Murder of the Environmental Leader Esmundo
Becerra], “EL MALETERO” “RED VERDE CAJAMARCA” (Oct. 31, 2007),
http://caballeroredverde.blogspot.com/2007/10/un-ao-del-asesinato-del-lider.html.
160. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, at 18.
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Convention on Human Rights to prevent and sanction these crimes.161
The petition documents overwhelming evidence that Forza implemented
Operación Diablo pursuant to its security services for Yanacocha.162 The
evidence includes hundreds of photographs and surveillance reports,
styled like those typically used by the police, which documented the activities of GRUFIDES personnel and other activists.163 These reports and
photographs were produced by employees of a subcontracted security
company who directed this intelligence to a Forza manager “in accordance with the terms of Operación Diablo.”164 Finally, there is documentation of payment for service between Forza and personnel from the subcontracted company.165 The GRUFIDES petition also documents the
specific acts of complicity of the Peruvian police force with Operación
Diablo.166 The proceeding of the GRUFIDES petition in the InterAmerican system has been subjected to significant delay given that to
date, three years after its submission, the IACHR has not made a determination regarding its admissibility.167
3. Business Track: Coordinated Surveillance of Social Movements
The theme of surveillance raised in GRUFIDES is further expanded in
Business Track. Business Track was a private security company officially registered in 2004 with the stated purpose of offering counterespionage and information security such as debugging telephone lines and
information technology systems.168 A retired military captain who served
under the Fujimori regime founded the company, which employed active

161. GRUFIDES Petition, supra note 139.
162. Id. at 9–20.
163. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, at 10 n.50 & 16–17.
164. Id. at 16 n.37 & 19 n.50; THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15. The reports were
directed to a pseudonymed individual. THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15. This pseudonym corresponds to that of a Forza manager as set out in Forza’s operations manual at
the time. Id.; Boyd, supra note 7; see also GRUFIDES Petition, supra note 139.
165. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, at 17 n.37 & 40.
166. See GRUFIDES Petition, supra note 139. Specifically, police returned all evidence to the known perpetrators. See THE DEVIL OPERATION, supra note 15. Police were
also filmed allegedly facilitating the escape of an accused perpetrator from police custody. Id.
167. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders 138, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 66 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/defenders/docs/pdf/defenders2011.pdf.
168. Ángel Páez, Rights Peru: Spying on Social Movements, INTER PRESS SERV. (Mar.
12, 2009, 10:08 PM), http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=46090 [hereinafter Páez, Spying on Social Movements].
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and retired military officers.169 The clients listed on the Business Track
website include oil, mining, and gas companies, as well as a number of
private security firms—including Forza—that primarily provide security
services to companies in these extractive industries.170 In early 2009, Peruvian authorities arrested Business Track managers and employees on
charges of illegally tapping telephone conversations, bugging offices,
and intercepting e-mail on behalf of third parties.171
The illegal operation fell in the wake of an oil-kickback scandal.172
Business Track allegedly recorded a discussion between a senior state
official and a high profile lobbyist regarding payments in return for favoring a Norwegian company’s bid in a petroleum exploration auction.173
The contract was subsequently awarded to the same Norwegian company.174 Business Track allegedly sold the recorded conversation to a competitor company, which then leaked the audio file to the press.175 The
scandal affected some of the highest officials in the Peruvian government, and Business Track personnel were prosecuted.176 The illegal surveillance company apparently made a political miscalculation in its pursuit of intelligence on behalf of transnational corporations.177
Following the arrest of Business Track personnel, the prosecution began to obtain victim statements while it reviewed and cataloged the
enormous quantity of audio and electronic recordings of email, telephone, and web-based conversations that were confiscated from Business
Track personnel.178 This process revealed that only about 20 percent of
Business Track’s surveillance information related to possible criminal
activity.179 The vast majority of the illegal surveillance targeted citizens
169. Id.; Carla Salazar, Peru Naval Officers Arrested for Illegal Wiretaps, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 9, 2009 [hereinafter Salazar, Naval Officers Arrested], available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1A1-D95JUB2O1.html; see also Notificación Judicial,
Exp. No. 527-09, 30 Nov. 2009, TRIGESIMO CUARTO JUZGADO PENAL DE LIMA [ThirtyFourth Criminal Court of Lima] (Peru) [hereinafter Criminal Court Resolution].
170. Páez, Spying on Social Movements, supra note 168.
171. Peru Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 20.
172. Oil Contract Scandal Shakes Peru, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2008, 7:20 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7656500.stm [hereinafter Scandal Shakes Peru]; Salazar, Naval Officers Arrested, supra note 169.
173. Scandal Shakes Peru, supra note 172.
174. Id.
175. Salazar, Naval Officers Arrested, supra note 169.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Criminal Court Resolution, supra note 169.
179. ¿Para quién trabajaba Business Track? [Who did Business Track Work For?], LA
REPUBLICA (Peru) (Aug. 23, 2009 11:02 PM), http://www.larepublica.pe/24-082009/para-quien-trabajaba-business-track.
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as well as private and public institutions in relation to questions of security or matters of national interest.180 The evidence made public by the
Court to date reveals that a significant number of the victims, from the
1990s onward, were human rights activists, mining activists, and grassroots community organizations, as well as several lawyers’ collectives.181
Among these individuals are the victims and advocates in the Majaz and
GRUFIDES cases who were surveilled during the time period corresponding to the issues in each case.182 Notably, the confiscated audio
files date back to the early 1990s—during the Fujimori era—and continue through the present.183 On the basis of these dates, it appears that the
military intelligence personnel who founded Business Track took their
intelligence files with them upon retiring from military service after the
fall of the Fujimori government.
This helps to explain the observation of the International Working
Group on Indigenous Affairs (“IWGIA”) that the scandal caused otherwise opposing political forces to align in order to prevent an investigation into Business Track’s client base.184 The Fujimori political camp, the
Alan García government, and at least some transnational companies operating in the resource extraction industry have a shared political interest
in curtailing an investigation into Business Track’s activities.185 As noted
above, while the Business Track scandal first broke in relation to the apparent corruption of the Alan García government in favor of a transnational petroleum company, the confiscated files also included recordings
of communications of civil society members made during the Fujimori

180. Id.
181. Daniel Yovera, Nadie se salvó de la red de ‘chuponeo’ de la Business Track SAC
[No One Was Saved from Business Track’s Network of Wiretapping], PERU21.PE (Jan. 18,
2009, 7:05 AM), http://peru21.pe/noticia/235084/nadie-se-salvo-red-chuponeo-businesstrack-sac. This includes, but is not limited to el Equipo de Promoción y Desarrollo de Ica
[the Team for the Promotion and Development of Ica], la Asociación Civil Foro Democrático [the Democratic Association Civic Forum], el Instituto para una Alternativa Agraria [the Institute for an Agrarian Alternative], la Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos [the
Pro-Human Rights Association], la Fundación Ecuménica para el Desarrollo y la Paz [the
Ecumenical Foundation of Development and Peace], el Instituto Peruano para los Derecho Humanos [the Peruvian Institute for Human Rights], y el Estudio para la Defensa de
los Derechos de la Mujer [the Group for the Defense of Women’s Rights]. Criminal
Court Resolution, supra note 169.
182. Criminal Court Resolution, supra note 169.
183. Id.
184. Country Report: Peru, in THE INDIGENOUS WORLD 2009, at 161, 172 (Kathrin
Wessendorf, ed., 2009) [hereinafter Country Report: Peru], available at
http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0212_I_09.pdf.
185. See id.
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era through to the present.186 Thus Business Track is a stark example of
how the political surveillance practices previously employed by a repressive dictator can adapt to meet the needs of the transnational corporate
sector when security services are privatized.
The IWGIA’s concerns about the investigation in Business Track seem
to have been proven. After almost a year and a half of reviewing Business Track’s audio files, at the end of July 2010 the criminal court Judge
issued her final decision regarding the judicial investigation.187 The
1,135-page decision is essentially a recitation of the 1,300 pieces of evidence reviewed.188 A key outcome of the report is the Judge’s refusal to
authorize the Prosecutions Office to investigate the identity of Business
Track’s clients—in other words, the individuals and institutions that paid
for illegal telephone tapping and email hacking activities.189 Ironically,
the Judge reasoned that such an investigation would be premature.190 As
such, to date there is no indication that Business Track’s powerful clients, among them Forza and a number of transnational mining corporations, will be subject to a criminal investigation.191
As indicated in the previous two sections, there are documented links
between Business Track’s surveillance activities and Forza’s alleged role
in human rights violations against mining activists in the Majaz192 and
GRUFIDES cases.193 These links suggest that transnational mining and
private security companies have formed a highly integrated network of
surveillance and information exchange regarding civil society actors who
186. Ángel Páez, Peru: Prosecutors Investigate Wiretapping Operations, INTER PRESS
SERV. (Oct. 30, 2008, 2:09 PM), http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=4451; Páez, Spying
on Social Movements, supra note 168.
187. Juez Martínez prohíbe investigar a los financistas de Business Track [Justice
Martinez prohibits the investigation of Business Track’s Funders], LA REPUBLICA (Peru)
(July 28, 2010, 12:32 AM), http://www.larepublica.pe/28-07-2010/jueza-martinezprohibe-investigar-los-financistas-de-business-track [hereinafter Justice Martinez prohibits the Business Track investigation].
188. Id.; see Peru Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 20.
189. Justice Martinez prohibits the Business Track investigation, supra note 187.
190. Id.; see Peru Prosecutor’s Office, supra note 20.
191. There have also been numerous allegations that evidence was tampered with during the judicial investigation and a Commission was created to investigate these allegations. Jueza Martínez asegura que USBs no fueron cambiados en dependencias judiciales
[Justice Martinez prohibits assures that the USBs were not changed on the court’s premises], LA REPUBLICA (Peru) (July 16, 2010), http://www.larepublica.pe/mapa/noticias-1607-2010 (follow title hyperlink).
192. See also Alberto Adrianzen, Paramilitaries Inc., LA REPUBLICA (Peru) (Jan. 19,
2009), available at http://www.peruviantimes.com/19/la-republica-paramilitariesinc/1395; Páez, Spying on Social Movements, supra note 168.
193. See also Adrianzen, supra note 192.
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criticize their activities. There is also reason to believe that this information may be used to facilitate the political persecution of these actors.
For example, as detailed in the previous section, GRUFIDES alleges that
Forza perpetrated Operación Diablo against local activists in the service
of Yanacocha Mine.194 It is undisputed that, at the very least, Business
Track tapped GRUFIDES’ phones during the height of Operación Diablo.195 It is further documented that Forza was a client of Business
Track.196 Thus, taking the above observations of the GRUFIDES and the
Business Track cases into consideration, at least two strong inferences
arise. First, there is reason to believe that Forza contracted Business
Track pursuant to the security services it provides to Yanacocha. Second,
there is a strong indication that the surveillance information collected by
Business Track was ultimately used by Forza to advance the objectives
of Operación Diablo, namely the persecution of activists working with
communities negatively affected by Yanacocha’s mining activities.197
Documents made public by WikiLeaks in late January 2011198 suggest
that this network of surveillance is deeply integrated with key foreign
embassies in Peru.199 The documents of interest are two U.S. embassy
cables dated just after the events of Majaz that refer explicitly to the
Majaz conflict.200 These cables communicated that the embassies of the
United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia, Switzerland and South
Africa “stepped up” efforts to improve coordination with major foreign
mining investors “with an eye to reducing anti-mining violence.”201 Indeed, the “violence against British firm Majaz” had precipitated a meeting hosted by the US and Canadian Ambassadors for representatives of
194. See supra text accompanying notes 158–66.
195. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, at 16.
196. Angel Páez, Perú: Una empresa, Business Track, formada por ex oficiales navales expertos en contrainteligencia organiza un sistema de información y control social
[Peru: A company, Business Track, composed of ex-Navy officers who are experts in
counterintelligence, organizes a system of information and social control],
PROFESIONALESPCM.ORG
(Oct.
3,
2009),
http://www.profesionalespcm.org/_php/MuestraArticulo2.php?id=11934.
197. Cruz & Romero, supra note 74.
198. Tim Webb, UK Firm’s Partner ‘Wanted Peru to Curb Priests in Mine Conflict
Areas’, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 1, 2011, at 27.
199. Id.
200. Cable from Ambassador J. Curtis Struble, U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru, Majaz
Anti-Mining Violence on Ecuador Border, to U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Struble Cable], available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cablesdocuments/38742; Cable from U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru, Unclas Section 01 of 03
Lima 003609, to U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Lima Cable 003609],
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/38881.
201. Struble Cable, supra note 200; Lima Cable 003609, supra note 200.
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international mining companies, including Yanacocha Mine, which was
later implicated in the GRUFIDES case.202 The objective of this meeting
was to review companies’ operating difficulties in Peru and coordinate
efforts to improve the investment climate.203 At this meeting, the Ambassadors encouraged the companies to report NGO-funded groups or individuals “that advocate violence” so that the Ambassadors would be able
to confront any NGOs from their respective countries.204 The mining executives suggested to the Ambassadors that they should meet with Peruvian and church officials to encourage them to rotate teachers and priests
in and out of conflictive mining communities to ensure that any of these
professionals with anti-mining sentiments would not stay too long in any
given community. 205 When the contents of these cables are placed within
the context of the Forza case study, they present a small glimpse of a
web of high-level coordination between the representatives of foreign
governments, the executives of transnational mining companies, and
their private security companies.206 The explicit objective of this coordination is to criminalize, repress, surveil, and dismantle local social
movements and their international supports that either critique and/or
oppose particular mining projects in Peru. 207
II. THE LEGAL ARRANGEMENT OF IMPUNITY
To the extent that systems of international and national law fail to
bring the perpetrators of human rights violations to justice, impunity becomes a legal and moral issue. The Forza case study tells a story of impunity for private security companies and public police officers working
in the service of transnational mining companies in Peru. Impunity refers
to the
impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account [in legal proceedings for the reason that] they are not
subject to an inquiry that might lead to their being . . . tried and, if
found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to mak[e] reparations to their victims.208
202. Lima Cable 003609, supra note 200.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Struble Cable, supra note 200; Lima Cable 003609, supra note 200.
207. Lima Cable 003609, supra note 200.
208. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Independent Expert to Update the
Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005) (by Diana Orentlicher) [hereinafter Orentlicher,
Principles to Combat Impunity].
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The following section reviews the de jure international and national
systems of law that govern Forza, but that have been de facto ineffective
in preventing or sanctioning the violations alleged in the above case
study. This approach is undertaken on the basis of the premise that in
order to confront impunity, justice advocates must begin with an empirical study of the legal mechanisms that exist in the midst of the circumstances of impunity. Fully examining the shortcomings of present arrangements of law is a crucial first step toward meaningfully contributing
to debates regarding law reform on the subject of transnational corporations and human rights. These debates are alive and well, and this issue
has been extremely contentious at the international level. As a result, the
UN’s pertinent agenda has been reincarnated into a radically different
framework since its initial conceptualization in the early nineties.209 The
most recent UN proposals have been the subject of a highly public, personal, and antagonistic exchange between UN Special Representative
John Ruggie and a Senior Director at Amnesty International.210 The regulation of the transnational corporation is most certainly an unresolved
complex issue and the details of this law reform debate are undoubtedly
far beyond the reach of this Article. However, the existence of this debate is briefly referenced here in order to make the basic argument that
209. See, e.g., Annex: Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, Letter
dated May 31, 1990 from the Chairman of the special session of the Comm’n on Transnational Corporations to the President of the Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/1990/94
(May 31, 1990); Press Release, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to the World
Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html; U.N. Comm’n on
Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003); U.N.
Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2005/69, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, 61st Sess., Apr. 22, 2005, Econ. & Soc. Council, 61st
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17 (Apr. 22, 2005) (creating the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations in 2005; renewed in 2008); Human Rights Council Res. 8/7, Mandate of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/63/53 (June
18,
2008),
available
at
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf.
210. Widney Brown, Letter to the Editor, Stronger UN draft on human rights abuses
needed, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at 10; John Ruggie, Letter to the Editor, Bizarre Response by Human Rights Groups to UN Framework Plan, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, at
10; Hugh Williamson, Amnesty Criticises UN Framework for Multinationals, FT.COM
(Jan.
17,
2011),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/36f72370-2226-11e0-b91a00144feab49a.html#axzz1bB2qL4Rx.
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empirical work, such as that undertaken in this Article, which analyzes
the impunity of the transnational corporation in light of applicable systems of law, continues to have the potential to offer important insights to
these broader international law and policy debates. This methodological
point is revisited again in the Conclusion.
A. Domestic Law: the Global Gap
The legal system in Peru has failed to initiate proceedings against Forza in any of the cases reviewed. This is arguably due to the limitations
created by a politicized prosecutorial system in a context where there is
very little political will to hold Forza to account. In the Majaz case, the
criminal investigation of the police and Forza officers was only initiated
under pressure from local human rights lawyers, and occurred over three
years after the incidents.211 The prosecutor subsequently closed the investigation twice in spite of a preponderance of evidence. While the investigation was reopened each time after appeals were made by local lawyers—five years after the incidents of torture and abuse—the perpetrators have yet to be charged or prosecuted.212 In GRUFIDES, the criminal
investigation of Forza and Yanacocha followed a similar pattern, although the appeals made by local lawyers against the prosecutor’s decision to close the investigation were ultimately unsuccessful.213 Finally, in
Business Track, the institutions, such as Forza, that allegedly paid for the
surveillance of mining activists, including activists involved in both
Majaz and GRUFIDES, have yet to be officially named.214 Indeed, the
Court has specifically decided not to investigate these institutions.
In light of the apparent failure of the Peruvian justice system, and given that Forza’s operations in the cases at issue implicate corporate actors
from a variety of jurisdictions, one must examine the capacity of other
domestic systems to address the impunity alleged in the Forza case study.
In the Majaz case, the rights to the Rio Blanco mine site have passed
from a British company to a Chinese consortium.215 In GRUFIDES, an
American company, a Peruvian company, and the International Finance
Corporation (“IFC”) jointly own Yanacocha Mine.216 All of these com-

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See supra Part I.B.1.
See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, at 18.
See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text.
BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 2, 20 n.32.
See Lerner Ghitis Calls for Further Dialogue to Resolve Protests, PERUVIAN
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.peruviantimes.com/03/lerner-ghitis-calls-for-furtherdialogue-to-resolve-protests/14340.

2012]FOREIGN INVESTMENT & PRIVITIZATION OF COERCION 559
panies employ Forza, owned by the Swedish corporation Securitas.217
Finally, Forza allegedly employed Business Track, a Peruvian company.218 Thus, Forza’s alleged human rights violations are linked to the interests of corporations based in at least five jurisdictions: Peru, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and Sweden, as well as one truly
international corporation, the IFC. A legal action against a multinational
corporation in its home state is usually brought by way of a tort action,
governed by either the common law or domestic legislation. However,
notwithstanding the intersection of multiple domestic jurisdictions in the
Forza study, there are significant obstacles to addressing the issue of corporate impunity in the “home state” of these foreign investors. What follows is a brief consideration of the possibilities of home state litigation in
two important jurisdictions: the United States and the United Kingdom.
GRUFIDES could theoretically be brought to an American court under
the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”),219 although the litigants have yet
to explore this option. It is well known that home state courts in Canada220 and the United States221 tend to refuse to take jurisdiction over the
harm investors have allegedly caused abroad, often due to a narrow application of the international private law doctrine of forum nonconveniens.222 In the United States, as of 2004 there were approximately
217. About Securitas Peru, supra note 78; Company Profile: Securitas, supra note 77.
218. Cruz & Romero, supra note 74.
219. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
220. Craig Forcese, Deterring ‘Militarized Commerce’: The Prospect of Liability for
‘Privatized’ Human Rights Abuses, 31 OTTAWA L. REV. 171, 201 (1999–2000). For example, Canadian courts have adopted such a narrow approach to the doctrine of forum
non-conveniens that most litigants have been unable to convince the courts to take jurisdiction over the harm allegedly caused by a Canadian corporation abroad. Id.; Recherches
Internationales Quebec v. Cambior Inc., [1998] Q.J. No. 2554 (Can. Que. Sup. Ct. J.);
Piedra v. Copper Mesa Mining Corp., [2011] O.A.C. 191 (Can. Ont.). One exception is
the decision of the Quebec Superior Court, see Association canadienne contre l’impunité
(ACCI) c. Anvil Mining Ltd., 2011 QCCS 1966 (Can. Que.), which was overturned in
January 2012 by the Quebec Court of Appeal, see Anvil Mining Limited c. Association
Canadienne Contre l’impunité, 2012 QCCA 117 (Can.).
221. In 2010 the jurisdictional hurdle disappeared in the states of Connecticut, New
York, and Vermont in favor of an absolute bar to multinational liability when the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held as a matter of law that multinational corporations cannot be held liable under the ACTA. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621
F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). The same Court affirmed this decision in 2011, see Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011) denied reh’g 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
2010).
222. Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 227, 229, 240–51
(Philip Alston, ed., 2005); Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality about Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 263 (2004).
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twelve active cases against corporate defendants under the ATCA, a
handful of which survived a motion to dismiss on the basis of jurisdiction.223 Indeed, most of the ATCA cases against private corporations
have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and none have resulted in a
final judgment against a U.S. corporation.224 This indicates that on the
few occasions that claims manage to survive a jurisdictional challenge,
they are either dismissed later on other grounds or settled out of court.225
Not surprisingly then, there have only been a handful of successful settlements in cases brought under the ATCA for corporate human rights
violations.226 Thus, to date, a resolution by way of a settlement is a common feature of every one of the few cases that have been successful under the ATCA.227
The application of tort law in the European Union (“EU”) is somewhat
more favorable to the victims of human rights violations than in Canada
and the United States, particularly regarding the doctrine of forum nonconveniens.228 A decision of the European Court of Justice in 2005 declared that the national courts of the EU may not halt proceedings on the
grounds of forum non conveniens in cases brought against EU domiciled
defendants, where the alternative venue is outside the EU.229 In this context, the British High Court was required to take jurisdiction over the
action in Majaz.230 However, the company nonetheless challenged the
existence of a legal basis for liability in UK law.231 While the Court
found that the claimants had an “arguable case” (a low threshold), it fur223. Koh, supra note 222, at 298.
224. Id. at 269–70.
225. Id.
226. Settlement Statement, Ctr. for Const. Rights, Statement of the Plaintiffs’ Attorneys in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell, Wiwa v. Anderson, and Wiwa v. SPDC 2 (June 8,
2009),
available
at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Wiwa_v_Shell_Statement_of_the_Attorneys-1.pdf.
227. Mara Theophila, Note, Moral Monsters under the Bed: Holding Corporations
Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2876 (2011).
228. Schutter, supra note 222, at 266–72.
229. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1383, ¶¶ 40–46, available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62002CJ0281:EN:HTML; Richard Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinationals (“MNCs”) for Violation of Human
Rights: An Overview of the Position outside the US, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR.
12–13,
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/richard-meeran-tortlitigation-against-mncs-7-mar-2011.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Meeran,
Tort Litigation against Multinationals].
230. Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinationals, supra note 229, at 19.
231. See id. at 11–13.
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ther commented that the case undoubtedly had potential legal and factual
weaknesses.232 While EU tort litigation against multinational companies
occurs in a relatively favorable legal context, due to the commercial reality of this litigation to date, no cases have been resolved on the merits or
have resulted in a finding of liability against the corporation.233 Rather,
among the few cases that have not been dismissed, most were resolved
through private settlements.234 Majaz ultimately held true to this pattern
when the claimants accepted a settlement offer in July 2011, two years
after initiating proceedings.235
This settlement pattern warrants further consideration of the dynamics
and implications of private settlements. If an NGO is litigating the claim,
settlement is often the only option.236 While NGOs generally do not stand
to financially gain from settlement, they may lack the resources to pursue
a trial, especially when litigation may promise to draw out over a period
of decades.237 However, claimants are usually represented by law firms
working for a substantial contingency fee.238 In these cases, settlement is
likely the best business option for the firm.239
Conveniently, Yanacocha offers an example of how such a settlement
might play out.240 In 2009 Yanacocha paid $3,000,000 to settle an action
brought to a U.S. District Court by the Municipality of Cajamarca in reference to a spill of 151 kilograms of mercury in the area that occurred in
2000.241 The Municipality’s American lawyers took $1,200,000 of the
232. Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475, [26] (Eng.).
233. See Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinationals, supra note 229, at 13–15.
234. See, e.g., id. at 26–36.
235. Oxfam America Calls on Peru’s President Elect to Take a Firm Position on Human Rights Protections, STATES NEWS SERV. (July 28, 2011), available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-262731750.html.
236. See Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinationals, supra note 229, at 13–15.
237. Current Cases: Wiwa et al v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al, CTR. FOR CONST.
RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/wiwa-v.-royal-dutch-petroleum (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012). In its recent settlement of the Wiwa case, the website of the Centre
for Constitutional Rights stated that the settlement would “cover some of the legal costs
and fees associated with the case” which the Centre had worked on for a period of thirteen years. Id.
238. See William R. Towns, U.S. Contingency Fees: A Level Playing Field?, WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.
[WIPO]
(Feb.
2010),
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2010/01/article_0002.html.
239. Id.
240. See Cajamarca Approves US $3mn Indemnity For Mercury Spill, BUS. NEWS AM.
(May
27,
2009,
4:20
PM),
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/waterandwaste/Cajamarca_approves_US*3mn_indem
nity_for_mercury_spill.
241. Id.
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settlement pursuant to a contingency fee and a further $115,000 in additional general costs.242 The Municipality was left with about $1,685,000.
This settlement—marked by significant controversy involving allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and incompetence against the Municipality’s American lawyers and their Peruvian counterparts243—illustrates
the serious ethical questions that can arise when elite (Northern) lawyers
purport to represent marginalized communities in developing countries
where there are few effective mechanisms of lawyer-client accountability.244
It is clear that, in addition to inherent financial challenges and doctrinal
hurdles, an endemic feature of civil law home state litigation against corporate defendants is the tendency to settle. A settlement is undoubtedly a
positive achievement in the sense that it offers the victims some compensation. However, as a systemic practice in response to corporate human
rights violations, settlements have certain drawbacks. Settlements do not
“bring the perpetrators to account in legal proceedings” as the definition
of impunity presented above requires.245 Rather, settlements allow the
alleged perpetrators to purchase their immunity from civil suits according to the terms of secret private agreements. Further, due to the confidential nature of settlements and the location of the proceedings in the
242. See Cajamarca Approves $3 M Indemnity for Mercury Spill: Peru, CHEM. BUS.
NEWSBASE
(May
27,
2009),
http://infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/0/1/1/purl=rc1_BIM_0_A201533525?sw_aep
=nysl_me_brooklaw. In 2009, the mayor of Cajamarca stated that “40% of the payment
will be used for legal fees and the balance for projects at the affected communities.” Id.
The 40% attorney contingency fee totaled $1.2 million of the $3 million settlement. Settlement Agreement, Minera Yanacocha and Government of Cajamarca 7–8 (Feb. 5, 2009)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement, Minera Yanacocha].
243. Letter from Mayor of Choropampa to Marco La Torre, Mayor of Cajamarca (Mar.
5, 2009) (on file with author); E-mail from GRUFIDES to “ADEFOR ADEFOR” (May
28, 2009) (on file with author); Letter from Gabriel Larrieu Bellido, Attorney, to Marco
Aurelio La Torre, Mayor of Cajamarca (May 13, 2009) (on file with author); Representation Agreement, Law Firm of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin &
Perwin, P.A. (Apr. 9, 2001) (on file with author); Settlement Agreement, Minera Yanacocha, supra note 242.
244. See David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for
Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645, 2660–62 (1991).
245. See Comm. on Human Rts, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot.
of Minorities, Rep.: Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations
(civil and political), Econ. & Soc. Council, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, Annex II (Oct. 2, 1999) (by Louis Joinet) [hereinafter Impunity
&
Human
Rights
Violations],
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.sub.2.1997.20.Rev.1.En;
see also Theresa Harris, Settling a Corporate Accountability Lawsuit without Sacrificing
Human Rights: Wang Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, no. 2, 2008 at 10, 13.
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investor’s home country, the resolution of a case by way of a settlement
undoubtedly militates against national or international public policy reform.246 Moreover, settlements deprive social movements of a court
sanctioned public record of events that might bolster their moral and political claims for reform.247 For these reasons, private settlements can be
seen as a means of privatizing the problem of impunity by converting the
accountability of the perpetrators into a private matter and by limiting the
impact of the proceedings on public policy and public action.248
These observations raise serious questions about the capacity of home
state litigation, at least in its present form, to address transnational corporate impunity and privatized coercion. It seems arguable that home state
litigation is better positioned to maintain the status quo of impunity rather than change it.249 Further, the presence of Chinese investors in
Majaz signals a new challenge created by the emerging shift in the character of the “home country.”250 Foreign investment increasingly originates in countries where there is very little history of home state litigation and where new, and as yet unexplored, legal challenges undoubtedly
reside to transnational corporate accountability.251 For example, China
has become the second largest foreign investor in Peru, and Peru is the
number one destination in Latin America for Chinese investment.252
246. See Impunity & Human Rights Violations, supra note 245.
247. See id. at 15; see also Orentlicher, Principles to Combat Impunity, supra note
208, para. 15 (“States must respect and protect the right of non-State organizations and
individuals to collect, preserve and make available relevant documents concerning such
violations.”).
248. See Impunity & Human Rights Violations, supra note 245, at 16, 23 (explaining
that inherent in combating impunity is the right of the public to know exactly what the
violations are, securing truth and restoring dignity to individuals formerly denied both,
and the obligation of the state to ensure non-recurrence of violations).
249. CAFOD Calls on Monterrico to Change its Ways As UK Multinational Settles Torture Case Out of Court, CATHOLIC AGENCY FOR OVERSEAS DEV. [CAFOD] (July 20,
2011), http://www.cafod.org.uk/news/international-news/monterrico-metals-2011-07-20.
250. Milagros Salazar, Social Responsibility Missing in Growing Trade Ties, INTER
PRESS SERV. (Feb. 3 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50206.
251. See generally Jose De Echave, Does Everything Have a Price?, MINES &
COMMUNITIES
(Aug.
28,
2007),
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=2274; see also Memorandum from
CAFOD, and Peru Support Group on Human Rights, to the Human Rights Jt. Comm.,
U.K.
Parliament
(May
2009)
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200910/jtselect/jtrights/5/5we38.htm.
252. Perú es el principal destino de la inversión china en América Latina al superar
los US$ 1.400 millones [Peru becomes the Main Destination for Chinese Investment in
Latin America upon surpassing U.S. $ 1.4 Million], EL COMERCIO.PE (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://elcomercio.pe/economia/465191/noticia-peru-principal-destino-inversion-chinaamerica-latina-al-superar-us-1400-millones.
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The above review depicts the global gap in domestic regulation and
law enforcement with regard to transnational corporations. The gap results from an array of deficiencies, patterned along North and South
lines. In the Forza case study, the Southern domestic jurisdiction (Peru)
has failed to date to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over Forza, while
the Northern jurisdictions pose formidable challenges to successful litigation against the corporations involved.253 Taken together, these deficiencies create a global gap in the domestic regulation of the transnational corporation. As a result, even in the midst of domestic systems of law
ostensibly available to address the alleged violations, the circumstances
of impunity are maintained. The Forza case study suggests that the potential for impunity is particularly heightened where transnational corporations avail themselves of privatized and internationalized sources of
coercive power. The following section will examine the extent to which
current international law mechanisms are capable of filling the global
gap created by the deficiencies in domestic legal systems reviewed
above.
B. International Law: Asymmetrical Enforcement and Privatized Norm
Development
The Forza case study engages three key systems of international law:
public international law, private international investment law, and private
corporate social responsibility mechanisms.254 Each of these will be considered in turn.
The two international public law human rights treaty administration
systems of relevance to the study are the Organization of American
States (“OAS”) system255 and the UN Human Rights Committee.256 Each

253. Rep. on the Mission to Peru, supra note 16, para. 72.
254. Public international law is defined as “[t]he law of nations, being that law which
regulates the political intercourse of nations with each other or concerns questions of
rights between nations.” BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (search term
“Public International Law”). Private international investment law concerns itself with the
“ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by commitment or otherwise, by foreign
persons of any interest in property” and the law that governs the interactions between the
investors. 22 U.S.C § 3102(9) (2006). Private corporate social responsibility “goes beyond philanthropy and compliance and addresses how companies manage their economic, social, and environmental impacts, as well as their relationships in all key spheres of
influence: the workplace, the marketplace, the supply chain, the community, and the pubSOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
INITIATIVE,
lic
policy
realm.”
CORPORATE
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/init_define.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
255. Of particular relevance is: American Convention on Human Rights, supra note
142.
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system has articulated norms relevant to the Forza case study. As a bedrock principle, both systems recognize that member states have a fundamental duty to appropriately prevent, investigate, and sanction all private
and public actors that violate human rights within its territory.257 Further,
both systems have declared that human rights violations occurring within
a member state’s territory become the state’s responsibility under international law when the state fails to carry out its duty to prevent, investigate, and sanction human rights violators.258 A study of the norms and
jurisprudence in these two systems concluded that the privatization of the
use of force traditionally associated with public law enforcement arguably contravenes state obligations under international human rights treaties and customary international human rights law.259
There has been very little international public law jurisprudence that
addresses human rights violations committed collectively by the state,
private security actors, and transnational corporations.260 Nonetheless, in
principle, the norms referenced above appear to confront the problem of
impunity depicted in the Forza study. These norms require that the Peruvian State carry out the criminal investigation and prosecution of those
responsible in the GRUFIDES and the Majaz cases. Further, these norms
arguably establish that at least some elements of the various arrangements of private security services used by mining companies in Peru are
unlawful under international human rights law.
In practice, however, both the OAS and the UN human rights treaty
oversight systems lack enforcement capacity with regard to their state
signatories.261 If either of these were to able to take jurisdiction and find
a human rights treaty violation in relation to any of the allegations raised
in the Forza case study, the recommended remedy would nonetheless

256. Of particular relevance are the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
257. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
¶¶ 172, 174 (July 29, 1988); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004).
258. See supra note 257.
259. Alex P. Kontos, Privatization of State Security Services 28 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript presented to the Canadian Council on International
Law 34th Annual Conference Fragmentation: Diversification and Expansion of International Law).
260. August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with
Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 222, at 37–38.
261. Id. at 46–53.
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require voluntary implementation by the Peruvian State.262 This process
is circular because it returns the analysis precisely to the originating
problem—the Peruvian State’s explicit commitment to the privatization
of security together with its evident lack of political will to address the
human rights violations in the case study. It is widely acknowledged that
the Inter-American system faces serious problems in achieving “meaningful and lasting implementation” of its reparations orders.263 Even
without taking into account the influence of powerful foreign investors
and the dynamics of privatization, the obstacles to implementation have
been identified by experts and scholars in the field as a lack of political
will and the powerful position of the armed forces and the police in Latin
American countries.264
The current enforcement deficit inherent in public international human
rights law is contrasted by the enforcement capacity of “international”
foreign investment law.265 Bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) protect
the interests of each of the foreign investors implicated in Forza’s alleged
human rights abuses: the American company Newmont in Yanacocha;266
the Swedish company Securitas in Forza;267 and formerly, the British
company Monterrico in Rio Blanco.268 Yanacocha’s investors further
benefit from a private investment contract.269 The terms of the applicable
BITs create enforceable rights for investors through a system of international private arbitration tribunals that can impose financial penalties on

262. Id.
263. Even while the decisions of international tribunals may not often be directly implemented by state signatories, they still may have indirect and derivate positive effects
on policy issues. James Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Supranational Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
217, 235 (2004–2005).
264. James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human
Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 788 (2008).
265. For a critique of the colonial and Western origins of the foreign investment contract, see M. Sornarajah, Economic Neo-Liberalism and the International Law on Foreign
Investment, in THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 22, at 173.
266. Gus Van Harten, Policy Impacts of Investment Agreements for Andean Community States (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Van Harten, Impacts of
Investment
Agreements
for
Andean],
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1461097.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. CHRISTIAN AID, UNDERMINING THE POOR: MINERAL TAXATION REFORMS IN LATIN
AMERICA
9,
16
(Sept.
2009),
available
at
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/undermining-the-poor.pdf.

2012]FOREIGN INVESTMENT & PRIVITIZATION OF COERCION 567
the offending state.270 A study of the political consequences of the BITs
applicable to four Andean countries, including Peru, highlighted the enforcement power of these treaties271 and concluded that they present major fiscal risks to governmental decision-making in the extractive sector.
This occurs because these treaties dramatically shift political bargaining
power in favor of transnational firms and against other social interests
that stand to benefit from efforts to regulate extractive industry investors.272 Since these BITs do not create any corresponding human rights
responsibilities, they are unable to alleviate the problem of impunity in
the Forza study. Rather, it is possible that the BITs may aid investors in
resisting regulations aimed at addressing the conditions of impunity. In
this light, BITs may well represent the privatization of the public power
that could theoretically act to address impunity.
Finally, Forza is indirectly governed by an emerging patchwork of privatized human rights norms.273 Forza’s multinational owner, Securitas,
signed the UN Global Compact,274 a private-public policy initiative for
businesses that are committed to aligning their operations with “ten universally accepted principles” in the areas of human rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption.275 Pursuant to the Global Compact, Securitas agreed that its business should support and respect the protection of
internationally proclaimed human rights and ensure that it is not complicit in human rights abuses.276 However, according to the UN Global Com270. Van Harten, Impacts of Investment Agreements for Andean, supra note 266, at
33; see Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in Investment Dispute Settlement, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251, 276–80 (2007–2008); GUS VAN
HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 58–80 (2007) [hereinafter
VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION].
271. Van Harten, Impacts of Investment Agreements for Andean, supra note 266, at
33; see, e.g., Odumosu, supra note 270; VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION, supra note 270.
272. Van Harten, Impacts of Investment Agreements for Andean, supra note 266, at
33. Odumosu, supra note 270; VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra
note 270.
273. Privatized human rights norms are self-regulated voluntary codes of conduct.
Reinisch, supra note 261, at 42–43.They are not state regulated and are not mandatory.
Id.
274. Responsibilidad
Social
[Social
Responsibility],
SECURITAS,
http://www.securitas.com/pe/es-pe/About-Us/Responsabilidad-Social/ (last visited Feb.
12, 2012).
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
275. About
Us,
U.N.
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
276. See Global Compact Principal One, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle1.html (last
updated Jan. 10, 2010); Global Compact Principal Two, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
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pact’s website, the compact is “voluntary and network based” and its
“light and non-bureaucratic” governance framework is focused on promoting corporations’ capacity to prospectively conform to the Global
Compact.277 As such, this initiative offers no mechanism for addressing
the criminal behavior of Forza officers alleged in the three cases reviewed.278
Yanacocha, the mining company that employed Forza in relation to
GRUFIDES, is governed by the most celebrated private human right
mechanisms. Yanacocha’s majority shareholder, Newmont, has directly
signed onto the UN Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative, the
Voluntary Principles for Security and Human Rights in the Extractive
Industry (“Voluntary Principles”), and the Position Statement on Mining
and Indigenous Peoples of the International Council on Mining and Metals (“ICMM”).279 Yanacocha is also governed by the corporate responsibility regime of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, because
its majority shareholder, Newmont, is an American company.280 Finally,
the human rights policies pertaining to the IFC are applicable because of
the IFC’s share in Yanacocha.281 Of these mechanisms, the OECD,282 the
ICMM,283 the Voluntary Principles,284 and the IFC285 permit the submishttp://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/Principle2.html (last
updated Jan. 10, 2011).
277. Frequently Asked Questions, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/faq.html.
278. See id.
279. UN Global Compact Features PTNNT as Best Practice, NEWMONT (Nov. 30,
2010),
http://www.newmont.com/features/our-communities-features/UN-GlobalCompact-Features-PTNNT-as-Bes-%20Practice.
280. Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD],
http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3746,en_36734052_36761800_36999961_1_1_1_1,
00.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter OECD, Members & Partners].
281. See Yanacocha, About Us, supra note 136.
282. In 2010 OECD Watch issued a report reviewing the effectiveness of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. See JORIS OLDENZIEL, JOSEPH WILDE-RAMSING
& PATRICIA FEENEY, OECD WATCH, 10 YEARS ON (2010). The report concluded that “to
date the OECD Guidelines have had a poor track record in dealing with the social, environmental and economic problems that matter most to communities and workers whose
rights have been harmed by the actions of MNEs,” and that “the main impediments to the
Guidelines being an effective instrument concern the confusion about their voluntary
nature, their restrictive scope as well as failings with the implementation procedures and
the lack of authority” of oversight bodies (NPCs). Id. at 7–8.
283. INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS [ICMM], GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND MINING 4, 95–105 (2010), available at
http://www.icmm.com/library/indigenouspeoplesguide (follow “Download PDF” link);
ICMM, ICMM Complaint(s) Hearing Procedure (Oct. 10, 2007), at 2; ICMM, ICMM
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sion of complaints. The outcomes of complaints made against Yanacocha
under the Voluntary Principles and IFC mechanisms will be reviewed
here.
Since 2000, three complaints against Yanacocha have been filed with
the IFC Office of Compliance/Advisor Ombudsmen (“CAO”).286 While
these complaints do not directly relate to Forza, it is nonetheless instructive to evaluate how they have fared. In general, the complaints alleged
that Yanacocha failed to fulfil its commitments to help the victims of a
mercury spill287 and that the mine adversely affected local communities
in a myriad of other ways.288 However, each of the three CAO complaints brought against Yanacocha failed to proceed from an initial investigation to a conflict mediation phase289 and none of them entered the
subsequent compliance or follow up phases of the CAO process.290 There
is no indication from the information presented on the CAO website that
the substance of the complaints were ever successfully addressed.291 By
ANNUAL REVIEW 2010, available at http://www.icmm.com/annual-review2010 (follow
“Download PDF” link). The only consequence of a successful complaint to the ICMM
could be the corporation’s loss of membership in the ICMM. See ICMM, Human Rights
in the Mining & Metals Industry: Overview, Management Approach and Issues (May
2009), available at http://www.icmm.com/document/716; ICMM, Human Rights in the
Mining & Metals Industry: Handling and Resolving Local Level Concerns & Grievances
(Oct. 2009), available at http://www.icmm.com/page/225/business-and-human-rights
(follow “related guidance” link under “What ICMM Is Doing” heading). However, there
is no record of this complaint mechanism actually being used by civil society actors. In
2009 Newmont received full marks from the ICMM for its reporting on it performance
under the ICMM’s Sustainable Development Framework. ICMM, MEMBER
PERFORMANCE TABLE (2009), available at http://www.icmm.com/our-work/sustainabledevelopment-framework/member-perfomance-assessment (follow “Download PDF”
link).
284. See The Principles: Introduction, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SEC. & HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/principles/introduction (last visited Feb. 22,
2012).
285. See INT’L FIN. CORP. [IRC], GOOD PRACTICE NOTE: ADDRESSING GRIEVANCES
FROM PROJECT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES II (2009).
286. Latin America & the Caribbean, COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMEN [CAO],
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/default.aspx?region_id=3 (last visited Feb. 29,
2012).
287. Yanacoch-01/Cajamarca,
CAO,
http://www.caoombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=110 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Yanaacocha02/Cajamarca, CAO, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=111
(last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Yanacocha-03/Cajamarca, CAO, http://www.caoombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=112 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
288. See supra note 287.
289. See supra note 287.
290. See supra note 287.
291. See supra note 287.
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August 2006, all three of the complaints had been closed without comment or explanation.292
In 2001, the CAO attempted to address two of the three complaints293
through the creation of a “Dialogue Roundtable.”294 At the time, this initiative was a celebrated innovation for the CAO.295 Yet a 2005 independent evaluation of the Roundtable questioned its capacity to serve as a
dispute resolution mechanism and observed that the Roundtable had
failed to respond to a number of key conflicts in its midst.296 Due in part
to this inaction, the evaluation concluded that the Roundtable had “never
been able to gain the legitimacy and broad community acceptance that
would enable it to [help ameliorate] the tension, distrust, and volatility
that pervade the relationship” between Yanacocha and the community.297
The conclusions of the 2005 evaluation are important because, at a minimum, to resolve the issue of impunity at the heart of the Forza case
study, the CAO would have to engage in public fact finding and conflict
mediation between GRUFIDES, Forza, and Yanacocha so that the perpetrators of the alleged violations would be “brought to account.”298 One
glaring testament to the CAO’s unsatisfactory resolution of the three
complaints against Yanacocha is the fact that in the wake of these complaints, and their closure, the conflict escalated such that the events documented by GRUFIDES ensued. In 2004, and again in 2006, mass protests took place against Yanacocha, resulting in the death of a protestor,
the murder of a Campesino leader, and the subsequent persecution of
GRUFIDES personnel.299
292. See supra note 287.
293. One complaint pertained to the Choropampa mercury spill, claiming that Yanacocha has not made good on its commitments to help the victims. The other complaint alleged that Yanacocha’s mining activities caused environmental contamination and increased social inequity in the region, among other adverse effects. See supra note 287.
294. CAO & Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency [MIGA], Report of the CAO
Expert Mission to Cajamarca: Preliminary Public Workshops 4 (Sept. 2001), available
at
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/documentlinks/documents/CAOSept2001Meetingsenglish.pdf.
295. Id.
296. Manuel Rodríguez et al., Rep. of the Indep. Evaluation of the Mesa de Dialogo y
Consenso CAO-Cajamarca, CAO & MIGA, 1, 9 (May 2005), available at
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/documentlinks/documents/MESA_Evaluation_Report_Final_English.pdf.
297. Id. at 1, 26–29.
298. Id. at 20–22.
299. See Amnesty Int’l, Peru: Fear for Safety, AMR 46/029/2006 (2006), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR46/029/2006/en; Peru’s Yanacocha Mine
Suspends Operations Due to Protest, PACE E BENE (Aug. 30, 2006),
http://paceebene.org/nvns/nonviolence-news-service-archive/perus-yanacocha-mine-
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The conduct of Yanacocha’s security forces during these events resulted in yet another voluntary human rights proceeding, initiated in 2007 by
Oxfam America against Newmont under the Voluntary Principles for
Security and Human Rights.300 This complaint was the first of its kind
under the Voluntary Principles, and in response Newmont agreed to an
independent review of Yanacocha’s security and human rights policies
and procedures.301 The 2009 report of the independent reviewer302 recommended that Yanacocha create a Risk Assessment and Conflict Resolution Office to “drastically investigate and sanction” violations of the
Voluntary Principles and urge the justice system authorities to do the
same.303 Further, it recommended that Yanacocha-paid police officers no
longer carry firearms and that Yanacocha collaborate with the police
force to train these officers to respect human rights.304 Finally, the review
recommended the termination of Yanacocha’s contract of service with
Forza.305
A critical assessment of the independent review suggests that the appeal to the Voluntary Principles failed to effectively address the issue of
impunity and privatized coercion portrayed by the Forza case study.306
First, the review failed to even mention the outstanding criminal allegations against Forza raised by GRUFIDES and pertaining to Operación
Diablo.307 Second, by failing to question Yanacocha’s economic support
for the police force, the review did not adequately critique the model of
privatized force.308 Rather, it further conflated the roles of Yanacocha
and the justice system by suggesting that Yanacocha should take a role in
the training of its police employees, and that Yanacocha should create an
internal adjudication process for addressing criminal allegations against
suspends-operations-due-protest; Milagros Salazar, PERU: Leaching Out the Water with
the
Gold,
INTER
PRESS
SERV.
(Sept.
20,
2006),
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34805.
300. See Press Release, Oxfam America, Oxfam Calls on Mining Company to Respect
Human
Rights
(July
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/pressreleases/oxfam-calls-on-mining-company-torespect-human-rights.
301. See Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, London, U.K., Mar. 18–
19,
2010,
2010
Plenary
Meeting
Rep.
2,
available
at
http://voluntaryprinciples.org/files/VP_Plenary_2010_Report.pdf.
302. Only a five page executive summary of the review is publicly available. See
COSTA, supra note 53, at 11.
303. Id. at 12–14.
304. Id. at 14–15.
305. Id. at 16.
306. See id. at 12.
307. See id.
308. See id.
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its employees.309 Third, to the extent that the review made proposals that
could partially address the issue of impunity or privatized force, these do
not appear to have been implemented. In the time since the review was
issued, there is no evidence that Yanacocha has prohibited its contracted
police officers from carrying weapons, nor is there any indication that
Yanacocha has terminated its contract with Forza. On the contrary,
community members regularly observe that Yanacocha-paid police officers are armed, and that Forza officers continue in the employ of Yanacocha. Finally, there is no indication that the company has taken action to
urge the authorities to investigate the criminal allegations raised in
GRUFIDES, nor has it clarified its alleged role in Operación Diablo,
either publicly or to the alleged victims of this operation.
Turning to Majaz, the British company Monterrico was not governed
by any of the corporate social responsibility mechanisms that Newmont
has purported to adopt.310 As a junior mining company, Monterrico likely
lacked the capacity to cultivate long-term relationships with local communities.311 Junior mining companies generally have a short life span
devoted to obtaining and selling mineral exploration rights.312 This is
exactly the process that was followed in Majaz, Monterrico ultimately
sold its interest in the Majaz project to a Chinese consortium.313 This
consortium has likewise not signed onto any of the aforementioned international corporate social responsibility regimes.314
The above discussion of the international law mechanisms applicable
to the Forza case study highlights the asymmetry in the enforcement of
309. Id. at 14.
310. While Monterrico was not a signatory to any voluntary agreements, it would have
been automatically covered by the OECD Guidelines since the United Kingdom is a
member country. See OECD, Members & Partners, supra note 280.
311. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 20–21 & 21 n.33.
312. Id. at 14.
313. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at vii, 2, 14 & 20
nn.32–33; Russell Hotten & Richard Spencer, China’s Year of the Rat Race Beijing’s
Power Play in the Battle for Rio Tinto is Part of a Long-Term Strategy to Build a Whole
Range of National Champions, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Feb. 10, 2008, at 8.
314. See discussion supra p. 496–97; Participants and Stakeholders, UN GLOBAL
COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/participants/search (follow “Participant
Search” hyperlink; then search “Name” for “Zijn” and “Country” for “China”; then follow “Search” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); GRI Organizations Search, GLOBAL
REPORTING
INITIATIVE,
https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/GRIOrganizationsSearchPage.aspx (last visited
Feb. 29, 2012); Participants, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SEC. & HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/participants/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Member
Companies, ICMM, http://www.icmm.com/members/member-companies (last visited
Feb. 22, 2012); OECD, Members & Partners, supra note 280.
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international law in favour of transnational corporate economic interests.
The legal regimes, such as the BITS, in place to protect foreign investment interests are strong while the institutions that administer international human rights conventions continue to lack enforcement capacity,
particularly with regard to the activities of transnational corporations. In
the Forza case study, the enforcement of these conventions continues to
depend on the political will of the Peruvian State.
The corporate social responsibility mechanisms that ostensibly govern
the facts at issue in this case study have also been described above. Of
these mechanisms, four would permit individuals or organizations to file
a complaint in relation to Yanacocha315 and two have already been invoked to this end, namely, the Voluntary Principles and the IFC CAO. It
is also noteworthy that these two mechanisms are arguably among the
most robust of the applicable corporate social responsibility regimes.
However, as discussed above, the appeals made to the Voluntary Principles and the IFC CAO regarding allegations against Yanacocha have
produced very little in the way of concrete outcomes for the affected
community members. In these specific circumstances, these two corporate social responsibility mechanisms have been unable to satisfy two
key aspects of the definition of impunity, namely, they have not brought
the perpetrators to account, nor have they been able to make reparations
to the victims.316 Perhaps most alarmingly, there is cause to wonder, particularly on the basis of the Voluntary Principles example, whether or not
the use of these mechanisms may actually perpetuate the conceptual and
practical conflation of private and public coercive power.
CONCLUSION: A METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION
From the perspective of Campesino and Indigenous communities in
Peru, there are a range of potential human rights issues that arise in domestic and international law as a result of transnational corporate resource extraction. These include communities’ right to land, free prior
and informed consultation—and perhaps even consent to extractive activity—and an equitable share in the benefits of resource extraction.317
315. See supra notes 282–85 and accompanying text.
316. Orentlicher, Principles to Combat Impunity, supra note 208.
317. See Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006); Case of
the Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005); Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79
(Feb. 1, 2001); Mary & Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1, rev. 1 (2002); Maya Indigenous
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However, the Peruvian State, under the pressure of capital exporting
countries and international financial institutions,318 has institutionalized
the primacy of foreign investors’ rights in the form of increased property
rights and the protection of investment rights. In this context, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights concluded that the basic land,
social, and economic rights of Campesino and Indigenous Communities
in Peru are being systematically violated by laws and practices that promote resource extraction and free trade.319 A broad and powerful social
movement has been consolidated in response.320 This movement finds its
expression in the interconnected work of certain NGOs; community organizations; and formal and informal transnational networks of concerned citizens, activists, and academics; as well as in protest marches
and road blockades.321 In response to this social movement and its demands, the Peruvian State and mining companies have frequently resorted to the use of coercive force.
In this context, this case study of the Forza security company has undertaken a particular methodological approach. First, it explored the legal
arrangements that structure the exercise of coercive power in Peru and
the formal and informal practices that characterize the security sector. In
summary, these are (1) the increase in private security companies and
officers relative to police officers, (2) the presence of private security
companies, in some cases foreign owned, that specialize in providing
services to mining companies and other companies in the resource extraction sector, (3) the high levels of participation of police and military
officers in private security companies, and (4) the formation of private
security contracts between the police force and transnational mining
companies. After analyzing the foregoing, this Article argued that public
and private security services are being reorganized in accordance with a
number of processes of privatization and that these services are increasingly at the disposal of transnational mining companies.

Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5, rev. 1 (2004).
318. For an overview of some of the interventions of the IMF and World Bank in the
Peruvian mining sector, see Gerardo J. Munarriz, Rhetoric and Reality: The World Bank
Development Policies, Mining Corporations, and Indigenous Communities in Latin
America, 10 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 431, 436–41 (2008).
319. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Second Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru,
ch. X, paras. C, D, E, H, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 59, rev (June 2, 2000), available at
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Peru2000en/TOC.htm; Country Report: Peru, supra note
184, at 166–71.
320. BEBBINGTON ET AL., MINING & DEV. IN PERU, supra note 13, at 17.
321. Id. at 17–20.
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Next, this Article investigated how these coercive resources are mobilized in response to social movements working on human rights issues in
the area of resource extraction. As such, the allegations in Majaz,
GRUFIDES, and Business Track were summarized. Each of these cases
points to the participation of Forza’s private security officers (as well as
police officers in the Majaz case) in the systematic persecution of social
movement leaders by private security companies.322 Further, attention
was paid to the procedural dimensions of each case. This information is
important because it indicates that, at least to date, none of the legal efforts associated with each case have succeeded in bringing the perpetrators of the alleged violations to account for their actions.
Finally, this study identified the systems of national and international
law that purport to govern the transnational companies associated with
Forza and the human rights violations alleged. At the domestic level, these consist of the Peruvian domestic legal system and the investor’s home
state legal system.323 At the international level these consist of the human
rights treaty system, the foreign investment regime, and voluntary corporate social responsibility mechanisms.324 Each of these mechanisms or
systems of law was examined in terms of its applicability to the Forza
case study and its potential efficacy in addressing the issue of impunity.
This process helped to illuminate the operation, in the context of a particular case study, of the global gap in domestic law and the asymmetry
of international law. It showed how the global gap results from a global
pattern of deficiencies in the domestic regulation of transnational corporations. The claimants in the three cases reviewed argued that the Peruvian justice system failed to properly investigate and sanction Forza. On
the other hand, in many jurisdictions in the global North, the courts are
likely to refuse to take jurisdiction over a lawsuit against Forza or one of
its transnational corporate employers, as the case may be. Where a
Northern court does take jurisdiction and proceed to trial, the experience
to date is that the case will be settled out of court. Notwithstanding the
positive dimensions of these settlements, this Article has argued that they
also carry significant drawbacks; in particular it is argued that, as a systematic practice, they may amount to the privatization of the problem of
impunity. At the same time, international law’s enforcement capacity is
asymmetrical in that the legal regimes that protect the rights of the investors that employ Forza are enforceable, while the regimes that purport to
protect the human rights of those who seek to bring claims against Forza
322. See supra Part I.B.
323. See supra Part II.A.
324. See supra Part II.B.
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lack enforcement capacity. In this regard, this Article argued that the use
of corporate social responsibility mechanisms by human rights claimants
may ultimately produce outcomes that serve to perpetuate the privatization of coercive power and to entrench the problem of impunity.
In sum, this Article used a discrete case study to explore how the conditions of impunity are maintained in the face of multiple systems of domestic, transnational, and international legal regimes. It has posited that
these regimes have failed in this regard because they are unable to confront impunity’s political and economic underpinnings, namely, the privatization of coercive force exercised in the service of transnational corporate power. In this respect, the Forza case study articulates with the
fundamental concern of Third World Approaches to International Law
(“TWAIL”) scholars that the international legal system works to disempower Third World325 peoples and intensify global inequality.326 TWAIL
scholars have argued that Third World social movements represent the
“cutting edge of Third World resistance to antidemocratic and destructive development.”327 They have declared that international lawyers must
“assist the ongoing global movement for global justice” in whatever
ways possible.328 To this end, TWAIL scholars have called for the development of “a theory of resistance” that would enable lawyers to respond
appropriately.329 In response, this Article has worked toward developing
a methodological approach to the study of the issue of impunity with the
potential to inform theories of resistance. It endeavours to map the coercive arrangements of power that threaten to curtail or even destroy Third
World social movements. This mapping begins from the experience of
particular movements, in particular political moments, and documents

325. TWAIL scholars have resurrected the term “Third World” on the basis that Asia,
Africa, and Latin America share a common history of colonialism and a common presentday experience of underdevelopment and marginalization. Introduction to
BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW 1, 3 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2003).
326. THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 22, at vii– viii.
327. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Third World Resistance: A Theoretical Inquiry, in THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 22, at 173.
142, 162.
328. B.S. Chimni, A Just World under Law: A View from the South, 22 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 199, 220 (2006–2007).
329. Rajagopal, supra note 327, at 162. In Rajagopal’s view, a theory of resistance
must, among other things, compel a fundamental rethinking of state-centered international law and the ideology of development. Id. at 162–71. It must shift the unitary conception of international law, as a political space consisting solely of states and individuals,
toward an approach based on social movements and the dialectic between institutions and
extra-institutional mass action. Id.
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the real life violations that threaten the political spaces that make these
movements possible.
This methodology is oriented toward identifying the meaningful and
strategic legal tools that movements can avail themselves of under current legal arrangements. It engages critically with national and international systems of law in search of a reform agenda that places the issue of
effective enforcement at the center of discussions on mechanisms for
protecting rights. In this sense, the adoption of the lens of impunity is
consistent with the call from critical international law scholars to focus
on the outcomes of legal regimes before committing to their vocabularies
and institutions.330 According to these scholars, the vocabularies and institutions of international law—particularly international human rights
law—must themselves be sites of critique and contestation. They caution
that if institutional outcomes do not change, then a change in vocabulary
in favour of human rights will only subvert the capacity for transformation.331
In this framework, this study’s methodology has been alert to the potential strategic pitfalls of engaging with particular systems of law. The
fact that well-intentioned engagements with certain mechanisms may
have inadvertent consequences underscores the need for careful reflection on the broader legal and political consequences of these mechanisms. Particularly, advocates must carefully consider the potential risks
associated with the activation of privatized human rights mechanisms,
such as voluntary corporate responsibility or private tort law regimes.
The Forza case study suggests that it may be difficult to engage voluntary mechanisms without perpetuating or reinforcing the legal and practical arrangements of the privatized coercion that forms the structural underpinnings of the human rights issues that advocates seek to address. In
the same vein, this study questions the costs and benefits of the privatized outcomes generated by home state tort law settlements.
Of the many issues facing Third World social movements, the issue of
systemic impunity for the criminal behavior perpetrated to benefit foreign investors deserves serious attention from progressive international
lawyers. These circumstances constitute a moment where national and
international systems of law fail to respond to protect the very existence
of grassroots resistance to inequitable economic relations. Just as this is
330. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law—20 Years Later, 22
EUR. J. INT’L L. 7, 12–13 (2009); see also David Kennedy, Professor of Law, Brown
Univ., Address at the Ohio Northern Univ. Pettit Coll. of Law Kormendy Lecture: The
Mystery
of
Global
Governance
(Jan.
25,
2008),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/speeches/GlobalGovernance(2).htm.
331. Koskenniemi, supra note 330, at 13.
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of deep concern, the persistence and tenacity of these movements against
all odds suggests that these circumstances likewise represent a rare opportunity for change.

